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l.Introduction. 
This study attempts to examine and to offer an analysis of the transition of the foreign policy 
approaches of the African National Congress (ANC) between the period 1989 - )294. Such a 
transition in policy approaches emerged against a background of prolonged political stagnation 
and deadlock for over three decades with the South African white minority regime. 
But in the light of global, regional and domestic political developments that occurred, the 
organization's external political policy was confronted by " ... a veritable blizzard of change 
which challenged its basic assumptions on international foreign relations (Al~.en ,1993:63)". 
At a global level these developments include, inter alia, the disintegration of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republic (USSR), the unification of the two Germanys, at a regional level, the 
implementation of the United Nations Resolution 435 and the independence of Namibia 
followed domestically by the unbanning of political organization and the initiation of constitutional 
negotiations in South Africa. 
In the debates about the transition of the foreign policy of the ANC, many scholars (Alden, 1993; 
Johnston and Shezi, 1993; Geldenhuys, 1990) tend to view the transition as a direct result 
of the international and regional political factors and pay scant attention to domestic political 
developments. It can then be argued that it is not correct to relegate domestic political 
developments to the background as their profound impact is felt at all politico strata, that is, at 
regional, international levels and in foreign policy making and approach. 
Thus, inter alia , it will be argued that the political struggles and changes that occurred within the 
l 
country, indirectly or directly led the ANC to redefine its foreign policy orientation, especially 
towards the developed industrial economies of the 'West'. Such developments encouraged the 
ANC to take up a series of positions representing a new foreign policy outlook. One which was 
bound to take cognizance of both the changing international, regional and domestic political 
environment. 
The ANC's foreign policy in its years of exile was premised on the existence of a substantial body 
of states in the international system (Lodge, 1988; Ellis, 1991) and adherence to the politics of 
liberation and international socialism (Johnston and Shezi, 1993) which constituted a formidable 
pressure group challenging the 'West' on questions like a new international eC9.!l9mic order and 
apartheid itself. It is reasonable, therefore, to assert that the ANC now faces the problem of 
matching its ideological heritage, its domestic priorities and its natural sympathies (Lodge, 1992; 
Thomas,1994), to a set of political and economic circumstances in which there is no real 
alternative to coming to terms with the industrialised capitalist 'West'. 
It is these circumstances perhaps, even more than the transformation of friends into, at best, 
distant and impotent observers, and enemies into potential partners and benefactors, that will 
condition the foreign policy of a new post-apartheid South Africa (Johnston and Shezi, 1993). 
Against this backdrop, this study will investigate the transition of the foreign policy orientation 
of the ANC between the period 1989 and 1994. Thus, it will analyse the overarching objective 
of the factors that might have influence a transition in the foreign policy conduct of the 
organization. And as such, to establish the inner connection between an envisaged new post-
apartheid foreign policy and to what Murray (1994:viii) referred as the" ... dead-weight of 
embedded structural political continuities left overs of the apartheid era". 
The genre enlisted by this study here is not original but owes its existence, ideas, insight to the 
writing and thinking of leading intellectuals, experts and academicians of the study of foreign 
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policy orientation. Whose immediate concerns are with the shaping of an envisaged foreign policy 
orientation of a 'new' South Africa, blended with carefully researched scholarship and committed 
partisanship on the subject. 
Such scholarly partisanship, will enable this study to piece together a coherent logically consistent 
argument out of a puzzling melange of their political accounts, foreign policy 
scholarly commentaries and academic research that have produced a rather large and generous 
body of accumulated empirical knowledge on the ANe foreign policy orientation and conduct. 
This study is organized primarily as an empirical derived text where " ... theory and history 
coexist indiscriminately (Murray, 1994:viii)" with the hope to induce some insight for an 
envisaged future foreign policy contours. Even though the study is infused by theoretical ideas, 
no concerted efforts have been made to contribute to a foreign policy 'theory-building' exercise. 
However, the study tries to maintain a delicate balance between a consistent account offoreign 
policy political events of the ANC, their repercussions on the one side and a critical assessments 
of key ideas on the other. Thus, in reality this is a piece of work on foreign policy navigation, a 
political exploration into the uncharted waters (Murray, 1994) of what will become of the 
present ANC led government foreign policy conjuncture. Where unfortunately, the whirlwind of 
the current conduct of foreign policy provides a few stable landmarks which are to fix one's 
scholarly bearing. 
Throughout its text the study will be guided by a logical distinct overlapping antinomy: change 
or continuity of the ANC's foreign policy orientation and conduct. Hence, the cent~al principle 
of the study will be operated by these dialectical pairs, thus, providing us with a broad framework 
of analysis. In this study, change or continuity affirm to underscore the commonalities ofthe old 
foreign policy conducts and the emerging one, in contrast to laying stress on the decisive rupture 
and qualitative breaks with the past. 
Such a distinction constructs a context for understanding the extent to what has evolved out of 
-,.-.. , . 
the transition of the ANC's foreign policy. Whether its policy orientation have either formed part 
of an ongoing, uninterrupted, evolutionary transformation from a socialist-marxist orientated 
approach (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992) to a liberal/capitalist inclined Western policy conduct 
(Alden, 1993; Murray, 1994) or constitute an original situation that will fundamentally and 
uniquely altered the trajectory of South African foreign policy history (Mills and Baynham, 
1994). 
In general, the study will examine the broad foreign policy outline of the ANe during the 
, 
liberation struggle era, explore the nature and effects of the crisis induced by the demise of the 
Cold War, unification of Germany, the implementation of the United Nations Resolution 435 
and the independence of Namibia. 
But the central focus will be to explore the foreign policy transition by reflecting the theory that 
even though international and regional political developments had an impact on the foreign policy 
transition of the ANC, the internal and domestic political struggles that had evolved during the 
same time-frame as both the international and regional political developments also had major 
contributions to the foreign policy transition of the movement. Within this context, the study will 
also explore the preliminary contours of a post-apartheid foreign policy as perceived by the ANC 
- .-::-
as to how the country will be reintegrated into the political and economic world order. 
1.1 Structure of the Dissertation. 
The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one reviews current literature on the foreign 
policy orientation of the South African liberation movement, with special focus on the African 
National Congress. The purpose of this chapter will not only be to situate the theoretical paradigm 
and foundation but also tries to open a niche for the thesis presented here. 
Chapter two attempts to examine briefly the ANC historical developments. The objective of this 
undertaking is to explore the ANC's foreign policy orientation, conduct and diplomatic 
approaches during the liberation struggle period. 
Chapter three examines the nature and effects of the crisis induced by political developments that 
evolved within the international, regional and domestic political system between the period 1989 
and 1994, on the policy orientation of the ANC. But, the central focus to be emphasised in this 
chapter will be to explore the paradigm as to how the internal political dimensions 
that evolved during the same-time frame as both the international and regional political 
developments contributed to the transformation of the foreign policy orientation of the ANC. 
Q 
On the basis of the above, chapter four will explore the preliminary contours of a post-apartheid 
foreign policy orientation as perceived by the ANe as far as South Africa reintegration into the 
world economic and political order. 
Chapter five constitutes the concluding section of the thesis and attempt to draw together 
various threads of arguments advanced in the study to provide a convincing logical conclusion to 
support the thesis presented here. 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
. '-:-
Introduction 
This chapter proposes to look briefly at the salient aspects of the debate on the ANC's foreign 
policy transition, by reviewing current literature on issues and factors believed to have 
transformed the organization's external policy approaches and engage itself in the basic 
assumptions of the main theoretical approaches employed in the study of foreign policy 
orientation, with a view to explore a theoretical framework that will inform the thesis presented 
here. 
The African National Congress (ANC) was, in 1960, legislated illegal and forced into exile by 
the racist National Party regime. As time matured, the organization developed into the most 
powerful exponent of the political aspirations and democratic ambitions of the majority of the 
African masses in South Africa. Thus, with considerable success, the organization promoted a 
pariah image of the South Afric,an regime abroad. 
These international and diplomatic achievements ensured its ability to internationalize the 
struggle in South Africa to unprecedented magnitude (Lodge,1988) in the political history of 
national liberation struggles. For instance, Phillips and Coleman (1985:12) inferred that " ... the 
broad support from most member countries of the United Nations for sanctions and other 
forms of punitive pressure against apartheid eclipse even the internationalization of the 
national liberation struggle in Vietnam achieved through 30 years of war and negotiations 
from the 1940's to early 1970's." 
Though its international achievements were not ephemeral for over three decades the 
organizations external policy, which was once characterized by international socialism (Alden, 
1993), was between the period 1989 and 1994, confronted by a veritable blizzard of changes both 
domestically and internationally. Such dramatic changes challenged many of the organizations's 
central assumptions on international relations. Thus, this political changes that manifested 
themselves between the period 1989 and 1994 could be perceived as being'crucial ill the 
transformation of the organization's foreign policy orientation, And, the centrality of this period 
has provoked a sizeable but growing body ofliterature on the subject. 
However, in most debates about the ANC's foreign policy transition, most scholars tend to view 
the transition as a direct result of the international political changes (Johnston and Shezi, 1993; 
Alden, 1993; Geldenhuys, 1990), particularly the collapse of global socialism and pay scant 
attention to the domestic struggles within South Africa. It can be contended that it is not correct 
to relegate domestic issues to the background as their impact is felt at all strata of the 
international political system, especially in the sphere offoreign policy. 
2.2. Literature Review and Theoretical Perspectives. 
By the end ofP W Botha's presidency in 1989, the Republic of South Africa was undoubtedly 
one of the most isolated country in the world. Apartheid gave South Africa a pariah image second 
9 
to none. Apartheid was one of the world's principal moral issues, uniting the international 
community as few other questions could. Beginning from February 1990, South Africa 
experienced a major political transformation involving the entire political order of the country, 
and also in the domain of foreign policy. A process of gradual international reintegration was 
experienced which ultimately meant the restoration of links severed as a result of apartheid. A 
detailed analysis of this is not necessary here as this has been done altogether elsewhere.! 
Fourie (1992) acknowledges that there are few comprehensive works available on the foreign 
policy orientation of Republic of South Africa, with the notable exception of Barber and 
Barrat (1983; 1990), Geldenhuys (1984; 1990a, 1990b), Frankel (1984), Pric€(1984), Metz 
(1986), Lugar (1986), Davies and O'Meara (1984; 1985), Selfe (1989), Swilling and Phillip 
(1989), Evans (1991), Vale (1991; 1992), Dietrishen (1994), Wellmer (1994). But even these 
studies, according to Fourie are, however, inadequate in explaining the probable future foreign 
policy orientation, because they have largely ignored the foreign policy of liberation movements 
which are expected and perceived to contribute to the formulation and orientation of a future 
foreign policy of the Republic of South Africa. 
It is has been observed that, in their critique on South African foreign policy analysis, Barber and 
, 
Barrat (1990) " ... focuses attention on the government, in particular the executive as a policy-
making institution" . It is probably understandable that foreign policy analysts have traditionally 
excluded non-state actors from their analysis and studies. For them foreign policy actors must 
possess the legal quality of sovereignty. Consequently, only states qualify for this role. 
See. D Geldenhuys (1990), "South Africa: From International Isolation to 
Reintegration" in Strategic Review jar Southern Africa, Vol. 13 (1), pp. 62-99 . 
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However, new realities of international politics have lead a growing number of foreign policy 
analysts to shift the emphasis from this state-centre paradigm. Thus, Holsti (1977:107) viewed 
the international system as the " ... environment in which the units (state and non-state actors) 
of international politics operates, where their goals, aspirations, needs, attitudes, latitudes 
of choice and action are significantly influenced by the overall distribution of power in the 
system, by its scope and by its prevailing rules". In this view, therefore, the defming 
characteristic of a foreign policy actor within the international system is the behavioural attribute 
of autonomy. Selirn (1991:260) refers to autonomy as the " ... ability to behave in ways that 
have consequences in international politics and cannot be predicted entireiy"by reference 
to other actors" . Thus, within the international political system an important development that 
emerged has been the ability of non-state actors such as liberation movements to obtain 
recognition as foreign policy actors. 
Selim (1991) further observed that when non-state actors formulate foreign policy and operate 
in the international system, they are confronted by problems that state actors do not usually 
experience. Non-state actors, especially when they take the form of a revolutionary movement 
aspiring to alter the territorial status quo, lack territorial symbols to draw upon as a basi~ for 
defining foreign policy. Haas (1964) on the other hand, contends that problems such as control 
and legitimacy, visibility, durability and manoeuvrability are also confronting non-state actors. 
Lacking a territorial base and the conventional means of conferring legitimacy, made these actors 
to find the legitimacy of their representation to be always in question. 
They must be concerned with the issue of being heard, perceived and recognized by nation-states 
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and international organizations. Visibility of non-state actors bring to the forefront the issue of 
durability and manoeuvrability, for the more they become visible and draw more international 
support. Haas (1964) argued that they run the risk of being portrayed by their adversaries as 
mavericks threatening international legitimacy. Selim (1991) observed that allies may also 
become a source of threat and thus supporters of non-state actors expect a higher level of 
compliance from them than they expect from their state clients. 
Consequently, by virtue of its undeniable impact upon the international politics of South Africa, 
its international status, its elaborate linkages with the plight of the African masses and its internal 
dynamics, the ANC, though not a state, has thus became a major foreign policy actor, and it 
undoubtedly deserves analysis. 
Against this backdrop, the ANC possessed an external policy orientation. One whose principal 
objective had been to isolate and de-legitimise the racist white-minority regime in South Africa. 
In the words of Joseph Frankel (1963:1) foreign policy is a " ... decision and action which 
involves to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others". On a similar 
note, Holsti (1983:98) perceive foreign policy orientation as a " ... state's general attitudes and 
commitments towards the external environment and its fundamental strategy to accomplish 
its domestic and external objectives". In analysing such defmitions it could then be asserted 
that foreign policy can thus refer to perception of the ideal level and nature of involvement in 
the international system, and preferred level of international participation. 
But, while it is true to assert that the ANC has a foreign policy, Alden (1993) in his 
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pronouncements argued that this has been a central part of the movement's existence and 
meaning. Johnston and Shezi (1993) in analysing the organisation policy approaches, inferred 
that it would be misleading to assume that it has a foreign policy in the same way and'to the same 
effect as a government would have. However, aspirant groups like the ANC do not control the 
resources of even a weak state, and they are able to have a foreign policy only by courtesy of 
other states and international agencies (Johnston and Shezi, 1993), in the same way as the 
weakest states need resources of the international support to have foreign policy (Selim, 1991). 
On the other hand, Lodge (1992) points out that the ANC has not had the responsibilities and 
dilemmas that go with being a government, has not had to choose between confliEting domestic 
and international interracial interest which may conflict with party ideology, and it has not had 
to match resources to interest in the pursuit of policy goals. 
Johnston and Shezi (1993) contend that the pattern of power and conflict which shaped 
international relations for many decades have shown signs of change since the mid-1980s. They 
further argued that these changes had direct and indirect impact on the ANC's approach to foreign 
policy. To them the central feature of this new phase was a substantial easing of Cold War 
tension. In supporting this proposition they infer that the pattern of global politics would no 
longer be interpreted in terms of bipolar rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, 
in which one superpower's gain means the others loss. 
This paradigm is as true for the Third World as they were in direct relationships between the 
major powers, and the changes were felt sharply in southern Africa. The cases of Angola and 
Mozambique, for example, are instructive. Thus, these suggests that the world which the ANC 
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has to confront as a government has changed from that which it confronted as a banned and 
exiled movement (Lodge, 1992). Alden (1993) echo similar arguments but stress that the 
transformation of the international environment which accompanied by the demise ·ofthe Cold 
War, removing familiar ideological signpost which had come to characterize that era, sent shock 
waves through the liberation movements and socialist countries alike. 
Johnston and Shezi (1993) point out that the Soviet Union in the mid-eighties was beginning to 
be burdened by exorbitant fmancial costs of simultaneously maintaining a modem military 
deterrent to the United States and supporting client regimes in the Third WorJd,ailunderpinned 
by a stagnant economy and sterile political system. Hence, by the end of the decade a state of 
profound crises was experienced. The depth of the crisis, according to Prozegen (1991), was 
acknowledged by the country's leadership since 1986. The year Gorbachev's reformist regime 
initiated a significant re-working of the Soviet Union's approach towards the Third world 
(Chakaodza, 1990). 
This dramatic policy re-orientation could be summarized by Gorbachev's official statement when 
he addressed the 70~ Anniversary of the October Revolution on 2 November 1987 (Alden, 
1993:70): 
" ... we are in favour of stepping up collective searches for ways of defusing conflict 
situations in the Middle East, in Central America, in Southern Africa, in all the 
planet's hot spots". 
In analysing this statement it could be deduced that the Soviet Union previously a supporter of 
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revolutionary means in Southern Africa, began to urge compromise with the South African 
regime as the best avenue to power rather than military insurgence (Alden, 1993). In the wake 
of these events, talks with the South African government officials were secretly broached by the 
ANC in 1988 (Fourie, 1992; Alden, 1993; Mills and Baynham, 1994) and such preparations 
eventually led to direct negotiations in May 1990. However, in his analogy Thomas (1994) 
critique that the sudden collapse of the communist states in Eastern Europe in 1989, the 
unification of the two Germanys followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself, 
indicated that the economic, military, political and ideological support which had sustained the 
ANC and its allies since the onset of the armed struggle were removed. 
. . ~' . '.~ . " 
Thus, Alden (1993) points out that such international political changes altered greatly the 
parameters of the ANC foreign policy orientation. On the regional political level, Mills and 
Baynham (1994) contend that events in Angola around 1987-88 effected profound impact upon 
the conduct of the movement's foreign policy activities. By the mid-1980s, with substantial South 
African backing, UNlTA's operations had grown to the point where it posed a considerable threat 
to the security of the Angolan MPLA's government. 
As a result, in 1987, after intensive training and careful logistical preparations which included 
massive Soviet arms shipments (Stiff, 1991), the MPLA government launched their largest 
assault ever. The MPLA government advance was stopped by a combined South African Defence 
ForcelUNlTA force short of its objectives (Alden, 1993). This was the first time since the 1975-
1976 military conflict that Pretoria admitted to intervening to prevent a UNIT A defeat (Mills and 
Baynham, 1994; Alden, 1993), and such an acknowledgement had major international and 
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regional implications for South Africa. 
Thus, faced with an increasingly sophisticated air force and an enlarged Cuban garrison in 
Angola (Stiff, 1991), and mounting economic and political disquiet at home (Vale, 1991; 
Johnston and Shezi, 1993), particularly after the Cuito Cuanavale stalemate, there was an 
awareness of limits to Pretoria's ability to project its power in the region (Tjonneland, 1992; 
Crocker, 1992; Saul, 1991a). 
Mills and Baynham (1994) inferred that the South African regime utilized the framework of 
negotiations set up by USA Assistant Secretary, Chester Crocker, to reach a settlement in the 
Namibian conflict. Thus, for the ANC, as Alden (1993) pointed out, the full magnitude of these 
changes taking place internationally came with the signing of the New York Accord in 
December 1988, an agreement endorsed to implement the United Nations Resolution 435 
concerning the Namibian independence and linked to withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola. 
The New York Accord brought to an end, decades of debilitating co~ict in both these countries 
and set specific parameters for a peaceful settlement in the region. And, one of the provisions of 
the Accord which Pretoria was able to tie to the agreement with the termination of its support to 
UNITA (Mills and Baynham, 1994), was the closure of the ANC military bases which were 
situated in central and northern Angola (Alden, 1993; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992). Such a 
provision according to Alden (1993) had a profound impact on the liberation movement's foreign 
policy strategies. 
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On the same note, Fourie (1992) viewed the foreign policy transition of the ANC from a non-
alignment perspective. According to Narayanan (1981), non-alignment is a " ... foreign policy 
orientation of international actors which attempt to assert their independence from the 
major powers in the system, and to demonstrate their ability to formulate policies 
independently from these powers". Ibis strategy is employed as a precaution against becoming 
involved in the military conflicts of the bigger states and it also mirrors the impression of a 
country regarding its own national and international interest. Singham and Hune (1986), further 
provide an analysis of non-alignment by proposing that it displays a cornrnitrneiifto the right of 
self-determination, which implies the ability and opportunity to develop its foreign policy 
independently of others and it strives to destroy the idea of alliance politics, or the 'bloc theory' 
(Fourie, 1992) of international relations. It is argued that non-alignment is an attempt by a state 
to have its foreign policy reflecting its own view of the world politics. The development of non-
alignment happened against the background of the Cold War. 
It can be stated that the ANC attended the founding conferences of non-alignment in Bandung, 
1955 and the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade, 1961, and has re~larly attended 
subsequent meetings. Were it have vigorously supported the first of the founding aims of the 
Non-Aligned Movement " ... enhancing the security and development ofthe less developed 
states" (Fourie, 1992: 96). It also adhered to all five principles of the Non-Aligned Movement 
by consistently supporting moves for" ... international peace and disarmament, champions 
the rights of those fighting for independence, racial equality and to the principles of 
economic-cultural equality and universalism" (Narayanan, 1981). 
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But in promoting liberation struggles, including its own, Fourie (1992) argued that the ANC 
compromised on the second founding aim of the Non-Aligned Movement independence from 
the super-powers and their power struggle. He further proposed that due to this compromise 
it was unable to destroy the idea of'bloc theory'. It can then be suggested that such an inability 
to destroy the idea of' bloc theory' tarnished its non-aligned image. This could be attributed to 
its political alignment to the Soviet Union [its overt alliance with the South African Communist 
Party 1 in order to receive military and ideological resources for its cause. The disintegration of 
the Soviet Union, and the ideological re-orientation of its successors, as Fourie (1992) suggested, 
meant a partial end of a close relationship between the Soviet Union and the·ANC. But, in 
addition to the trend suggested above, such a sudden pattern of change in global politics resulted 
in a semi-transformation of the organization's foreign policy approaches and strategies. 
As is evident from the discussion outlined above, most scholars tend to perceive the transition 
as being solely effected by international and regional political events. Such arguments are, 
however, deficient in that they neglect to highlight the role played, either directly or indirectly, 
by the political, social and economic determinants that constitute the system in which the 
domestic political environment exists and operates. 
It could be argued that these international political events coupled with the rapidly changing 
domestic political conditions greatly altered the parameters of the foreign policy approaches of 
the ANC. Such dramatic changes ultimately led the organization to shift its external policy 
approaches from a liberation rhetoric stance to a more pragmatic conciliatory position. 
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With its capacity to pursue a military solution to the conflict partially limited by changes within 
the international and regional political environment, especially in its persuasion of the armed 
struggle, a negotiated settlement with Pretoria assumed a central position in the ANt'~ evolving 
strategy (Ellis, 1991; Evans, 1991; Hamill, 1990). Concurrently, the South African 
regime, on the other hand, recognized that the pursuit of an "internal solution" without the 
involvement of the ANC was a non-starter (Alden, 1993; Johnston and Shezi, 1993; Hayson, 
1992). Direct contact between the two parties was made in London in 1989 (Ellis and 
Sechaba,1992; Hayson, 1992), complementing the opening of serious talks with Mandela and 
Botha in South Africa itself as to the terms of his release. 
Subsequently, the ANC issued its pre-conditions for engaging in direct negotiation f). Conscious 
of the opportunity afforded by the collapse of communism and bolstered by the ANC's 
increasingly conciliatory attitude towards a negotiated settlement, as Hayson (1992) reiterated, 
the regime undertook to transform the domestic stalemate confronting South Africa. 
Thus, on February 1990, the government announced the unbanning of the ANC, SACP and the 
PAC, as well as the release of Nelson Mandela (Chakaodza, 1990). In doing so, the de Klerk 
government shattered the die which had moulded the foreign policy orientation of the ANC for 
over three decades (Alden, 1993). In balancing these radical developments of South African 
internal politics, Lodge (1992) inferred that its foreign policy approaches attempted to 
2 Known as the Harare Declaration, these included the release of political prisoners; the 
removal of restrictions on political organizations; the repeal of security legislation, and 
removal of troops from the townships and an end to political trials and executions . 
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conceptualize events in terms familiar to the organization and to retain support from their 
established constituencies at home and abroad during the transition. 
Hence, the political, military and diplomatic components of the movement's existing approach 
to foreign policy retained a role and, seemingly, a direct relevance to the new situation 
confronting the organization. However, Hayson (1992), points out that the domestic 
circumstances demonstrated that contradictions between the residual imperatives of liberation 
politics and those of the dynamics of the transition [negotiations) process within the larger 
context of the internal environment proved to be problematic. 
Consequently, Carrim (1993) proclaimed that due to a range of domestic conflicts such as the 
inability to reduce violence in strife-tom areas, to contain massive consumer protest, to reduce 
industrial mass actions,to diffuse tribal and intergroup conflicts, to stop school boycotts, and 
many other conflict phenomenons, the organization's political credibility was damaged. Against 
this backdrop, it can be asserted that such domestic conflicts and issues, either directly or 
indirectly, affected the organization's foreign policy. 
Equally significant other domestic factors such as the strength of the political forces on the 
ground, the organized trade and labour union movements, the massive strength of the mass 
democratic movement, and political awareness among the majority of South Africans can be said 
to have contributed to a dramatic transition of the ANC foreign policy approaches. 
In order to concern our discussion with issues involved in analysing foreign policy, and in 
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evaluating the theoretical paradigms that can be useful in providing a framework of analysis to 
inform the thesis presented here, our analysis will adopt two approaches: the traditional and 
the linkage paradigms. 
The traditional approach tends to elicit a distinction between the international and domestic 
political system (Calvert, 1986) in which foreign policy is a boundary problem in at least two 
aspects. Firstly, foreign policy is that" .... area of politics which bridges the all-important 
boundary between the nation-state and its international environment" (Wallace, 1974:12). 
The boundary which defines the nation· state, within the limits of which national governrilents 
claim supreme authority (sovereign). Secondly, the study offoreign policy analysis also " ... 
straddle the boundary between two academic disciplines"(Farrands, 1989:39), that is, the 
study of domestic government and politics (political Science), and the largely separate study of 
international politics and diplomacy (international Relations) . Both these aspects of the 
problem have given a certain distinctiveness, and a peculiar difficulty, to the study as well as the 
analysis of foreign policy. 
F arrands (1989) cont~nds that the separation of foreign policy analysis from domestic policy 
issue is a fundamental concept to the traditional approach. Here, traditional foreign policy 
analysts perceive domestic politics as having influence within the secure boundaries provided 
by the sovereign authority (Wallace, 1974). Thus, in analysing political developments, there has 
been a tendency among traditional analysts to treat the objective process of the domestic 
environment as given factors or even to ignore it altogether. 
Mpho Machesa 21 
Wallace (1974) criticizes the study offoreign policy, as a continuous process that bridges the 
analytical barrier between the international and domestic political systems has suffered 
from a poverty of theoretical concepts and a relative neglect of detailed research. One'Cirthe areas 
of disagreement concerns the relationship between foreign policy and the domestic political 
process. In the traditional conception, Kissinger (1969) postulates that the domestic structure is 
taken as given. To them foreign policy begins where domestic issues ends. The importance 
traditional analysts place on the role of domestic political developments in the formation/change 
of foreign policy depends partly on how they approach their analysis. 
And this emanates from its role within the domestic political system or within the international 
politics tenet, thus, they employ such an analysis in order to contain the spread of what they must 
cover (Kissinger, 1969). According to Wallace (1974) they limit their attention to governments 
and foreign offices and regard the domestic context as one of the background factors. 
The linkage approach, according to Rosenau (1980), was not developed in response to either 
normative pressures or sheer intellectual curiosity. Rather, its initial formulation arose out of 
conviction that the student and the analyst of comparative and international politics were 
needlessly and harmfully ignoring other issue areas of the study of Foreign Policy (Rosenau, 
1980; Calvert, 1989). 
Scholars oflinkage approach observed that the world system had become so small and complex, 
thus, their analysis in comparative (Le. national and sub-national) politics could no longer 
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afford to treat domestic variables as constant features of the world scene (Rosenau, 1974;1980). 
They propose that the concept 'linkage' serves as a basic unit of analysis (Rosenau, 1974; 1980; 
Calvert, 1989; Hogan, 1987) in order to can critique foreign policy issues existing Within the 
world system. To them, 'linkage approach' is define as " ... any sequence of behaviour that 
originates in one system and is reacted to in another" (Rosenau, 1980:180). 
Perhaps most of the analysis into the linkage phenomena, according to Calvert (1989), have been 
nation-state centred, with one or another external environment as the source of outputs and the 
national society as the locus of inputs. On the basis of the trend outlined above, it can be 
suggested that the linkage framework provided a new rhetoric with which to analyse old 
problems. 
Although it is often assumed that politics stop at the water edge, Hogan (1987) argued that 
domestic and foreign policy are typically interwoven. Rosenau (1974) on a similar tone, echoes 
that although foreign policy overlaps both domestic and international politics, it can be 
distinguished as there is a form of 'linkage' [a bridge], between the two. Hence, the theoretical 
propositions that are unique to the field of foreign policy, accor?ing to Rosenau (1980), are 
those that analyze the occasion between the two sets of variations rather than only the behaviour 
of the national actor or only the events in its environment. Thus, it can be proposed that foreign 
policy undertakings cannot be completely divorced from either the society out of which they 
emanate or the circumstances abroad towards which they are directed. 
Against this background, it can then be suggested that for the purpose of critiquing the content 
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of the thesis presented in this study, the linkage approach be employed as an analytical tool to 
understand foreign policy analysis of the ANC. While studying domestic politics, it is convenient 
to take the external environment as given, and conversely in studying intemational"relations to 
regard each state as a 'black box'. 
But in the study of foreign policy neither of these convenient assumptions can be made. It can 
then be asserted that foreign policy involves an understanding of both the domestic and 
external environment and how they relate to one another. 
2.3. Conclusion. 
In summation, it could be stated that this chapter set out to review current literature on the 
debates believed to have transformed the foreign policy orientation and conduct of the 
African National Congress. It also explores the theoretical frameworks that informed the thesis 
presented here. 
As observed in the text, it could be deduced that the field of foreign policy analysis is seen to 
cover a vast range of phenomena. It has been affirmed in this chapter that circumstances arise 
whereby virtually every aspect of local, national and international politics may be part of foreign 
policy processes. Hence, scholars and analysts who approach foreign policy analysis by eliciting 
a traditional conception tend to make distinction between domestic and international politics in 
which social determinants, sources, behaviour, attitudes, opinions and civil defiance co-exist and 
prevails, have provided a certain peculiar difficulty to the study of foreign policy and its analysis. 
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It could then be concluded that since foreign policy is a constantly unfolding process, its analysis 
should not afford to treat domestic variables as static and constant features of international 
political scenes and events. Because their impact is felt at all strata of the international political 
environment. Thus, in employing an approach which is more adaptive to both domestic and 
international political settings, such as linkage paradigm, one will be in a position and be able 
to situate the thesis presented in this study to can provide the basic analytic frameworks for 
subsequent chapters in assessing both the international and domestic political factors in order to 
have a clear-cut perception about issues that have affected the dramatic transition of the ANC 
foreign policy approaches. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ANC IN EXILE: A mSTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. 
3.1. Introduction. 
In analysing the development and subsequent transition of the organisation's foreign policy 
conduct and orientation, it will be essential in this chapter to sketch out briefly the historical 
conceptions of the ANC, especially the development of its international activities from the time 
of its banning in 1960 until its unbanning in 1990. But it will perhaps be useful for this chapter 
before discussing brief accounts of the organisation main external policy development, to outline 
in short the formation and its character before 1960. 
3.2.The Formation and Development of the ANC: An Overview. 
Throughout the entire international political-system, no sovereign state has been more 
consistently and soundly condemned for its institutionalized racial behavioral character than the 
Republic of South Africa (Karis and Carter, 1972; Gerhart, 1978; Walshe, 1971; Meii, 1988; 
Lodge, 1988). Such condemnations were influenced by an entrenched white-minority perception 
and belief that for the retention and extension of their political, social and economic power over 
black South Africans,3 legislations instituting systematic segregation and discrimination were 
required. 
3 
"The term "black South Africans" in these context connotes the following races: the 
"Indigenous" Black societies of African descent, "Coloured" people of mixed origins, 
and "Asians" populations of Indian ' or Pakistani origin. 
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With such peculiar objectives in mind and in blatant contrast to the rest of the world, white South 
African regime imposed a series of rigid laws and legislations making race and colour the sole 
criterion for authorized behaviour (Lauren, 1988). It is hardly surprising that sueh kind of 
repressive behaviour and blatant racism provoked substantial serious reactions and defiance from 
the leading black organization, the African National Congress CANC), which since its formation 
in 1912 (Meli, 1988; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992) had been the outspoken voice of the oppressed 
black South Africans. But such reactions by the organization were met with retaliatory repressive 
and brutal legislation by the South African regime (Gibson, 1972; Leach, 1986; Meli, 1988; 
Ellis and Sechaba, 1992). Such state legislations ultimately led to the banning of the 
organization and imprisonment of most of its leadership. 
Thus, in continuing with the struggle for the emancipation of the black people in South Africa, 
the organization had no alternative but to continue its activities from exile (Meli, 1988; Ellis and 
Sechaba, 1992). A decision that was to see the organization continuing the struggle for liberation 
for over three decades from exile. Lodge (1988) postulated that as an exile movement, the 
organization not only survived exile but it has been strengthened by that experience, especially 
in the domain of its activities in conducting foreign relations and establishing international 
diplomatic links. 
At its foundation in 1912, the South African Natives National Congress (SANNC), later 
renamed the African National Congress (ANC) betrayed few signs of becoming a formidable 
opposition to white minority rule (Meli, 1988; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992). According to Meli 
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(1988) it was rather a genteel organisation, established by what were then the pillars of black 
South African society, that included individuals with some western education as well as 
traditional chiefs. But its chief distinction was the claim to being the frrst modem~on-tribal 
organization (Davis, 1987) of blacks formed to discuss the socio-economic and political plight 
of black South Africans. 
Its political platform reflected resignation to the reality of white-rule, though not to all its 
consequences. Hence, its tactic was to lobby and petition on behalf of black people. Ellis (1991) 
contends that in its early years of development, the organization was not a mass organization, that 
it made no attempt to apply pressure toward the state by such tactics as strikes or demonstrations 
and that it appears to have engaged in little formal activity beyond its annual general meetings. 
Furthermore, he argues that it did not represent the views of whites, Indian or coloured South 
Africans, nor was membership open to them, and beyond a moderate professed nationalism, the 
organization had no ideology. 
It could be stated that the administrative seeds of apartheid and separate development were sown 
in the century's fust decades by the new government of the Union of South Africa 4, which started 
, 
to deny black South African economic and political power (Lauren, 1988). It was to these laws, 
4 For a detailed study of South African History , see for example: C W de Kiewiet 
(1966) A History of South Africa: Social and Economic. University Press Oxford. 
T R H Davenport (1978) South Africa: A Modem History . University Press, 
Toronto. J D Omar-Cooper (1966) The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth Century 
Revolution in Bantu Africa. Longmans, London. R. Lacour-Gayet (1977) A History 
of South Africa. Cassell and Company , London; and J Selby (1973) A Short History 
of South Africa. Allen and Unwin Publishers, London. 
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which included legislations such as the 1913 Land Act and racial segregation acts, that the early 
ANC addressed itselfto (Davis, 1987). 
Though conservative in tactics and approach to political issues of that time, Meli (1988) asserted 
that the organization nevertheless played a critical role in initiating modem black protest in South 
Africa. The organization first developed a relationship with the Communist Party of South Africa 
in the 1940's (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992), a relationship that was to last for over several decades. 
These were to play a crucial role in influencing the direction of the ANC foreign policy 
orientation (AIden, 1993). One dimension that made the ANC/SACP a natural alliance was the 
belief held by both organizations that it was their duty to work in the first instance for majority 
rule in South Africa (Ellis and Sechaba,1992; Lodge, 1988). 
An era that led the organization to embark on mass demonstrations, strikes and defiance 
campaigns was ushered by the aftermath of the 1948 white general elections which saw the 
Afrikaner dominated National Party swept into power (Gerhart, 1972; Lacour-Gayet, 1977; 
Nelson, 1975; Meli, 1988). Thus, Nelson (1975) inferred that to consolidate its new acquired 
status, it moved quickly to solidify, formalize and entrench the racial segregation system, and its 
apartheid doctrine of white supremacy. 
As Gibson (1972) observed, by the time the new mass of legislation were promulgated in 
parliament, black South Africans were already facing tight control by the government over their 
schools, a ban on unionisation, racial segregation by residential and commercial zones, under the 
draconian Group Areas Act, further restriction on opposition politics under the broadly worded 
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suppression of Communism Act, prohibitions on all interracial, sexual and marital relations. Such 
reverberations, from the National Party's apartheid earthquake, as Davis (1987) pointed out, 
reached the organization inner circle in the firm of bitter political infighting. 
But a new generation of impatient activists, such as Anton Lembede [who died tragically 
young), Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, WaIter Sisulu, Robert Sobukwe and others, 
gathered under the banner of the Congress Youth League. They campaigned to transform the 
ANC from the small and somewhat toothless organization it had previously been into a more 
militant organisation (Ellis, 1991). Through concerted efforts and political inputs by these the 
new leadership the organisation in the 1950's launched a series of mass protests and 
demonstrations that were to reach a climax through the 1952 Defiance Campaign. The 1950's 
also saw a noticeable shift and a further radicalization in the field of ideas and programme of 
action. The organisation leadership articulated in 1953, the idea of drawing up a people's charter 
rights, the Freedom Charter, a statement of aims. This was adopted on the 25th -26th March 
1955 by the Congress ofthe People which took place in Kliptown, near Johannesburg (polley, 
1989; Meli,1988). Thus the Freedom Charter became the common programme enshrining the 
hopes and aspirations of all the progressive people of South Africa (Meli, 1988:124). 
The method of achieving these aims, the forces of change, the strategy and tactics to be followed 
is not spelt out clearly in the Freedom Charter itself, but in the 1969 Strategy and Tactics 
documents of the ANC (Kotze, 1989). By adopting the Charter, the ANC committed itself in 
precise terms to what it stood for. Thus, this envisaged new society was conceived not in vague 
terms, but specifically on the principle of common access to, and benefits from the wealth of the 
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country (Meli,1988). 
Though, the paramount question in South Africa was the advocacy of equality of different ethnic 
groups and the impennissibility of all privileges in this respect it could be stated that the 
Freedom Charter was not unmindful of the organisations internationalist commitments. The 
essence of the organisations foreign policy orientation as embodied in the Freedom Charter will 
be reviewed in Chapter Four. It could be asserted that it was only in the 1950's that the ANC 
began in earnest to sharpen the weapon for mass direct action and fonnulating a statement of 
aims that was to become the cornerstone of the movement. Thus, by the time it was banned in 
1960, the organisation had taken on a look that would remain largely constant for the coming 
decades. 
3.3. ANC in Exile. 1960-1990. 
The Sharpeville incidents of 1960, heightened in a significant way international concern for the 
situation in South Africa. This heightened concern was reflected in increased activities by various 
international groups and organisations (Nelson, 1975). Thus, building upon a series of earlier 
resolutions, the United Nations Organisation, voted to condemn South Africa universally and 
requested all member-states to take both separate and collective action to force South Africa to 
abandon its racial policies (Lauren, 1988). 
Although shaken by this strong international reaction to the Sharpeville killings, Ellis and 
Sechaba (1992) stated that the minority regime defiantly refused to modify its policies. A state 
of emergency was declared, censorship on the media was imposed, blacks were arrested without 
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warrant and the ANC and PAC were declared unlawful organizations. By contrast, the ANC had 
developed some important tools that helped it to sUlVive the 1960 crackdown, the Mandela' s M-
Plan (Meli, 1988), implemented only on a patchwork scale in the 1950's, represented the 
blueprint for transition to underground operations (Davis, 1987). Therefore, the ANC programme 
between 1960 and 1964 moved from an initial position of continued non-violence to an 
acceptance of the need for selective violence (Meli,1988; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992) and this was 
accepted by the Congress only after it experienced failures to its non-violent methods. 
Hence, a reciprocal "violence" by the black people had become inevitable. In order to channel 
the feeling of the people into organised resistance, the Congress established a semi-independent 
body to organise acts of sabotage against government installations. Such a decision led to the 
formation ofUmkhonto we Sizwe, which later became the armed-wing of the ANC (see: Davis, 
1987:15; Nelson, 1975:158; Meli, 1988:145-148). Two days before the organisation was 
banned, Oliver Tambo, Secretary-General of the ANC, slipped out of the country to set up an 
external mission, under orders from the National Executive, and his task was to canvass 
international support (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992). It was through the formation of the external 
mission that the international efforts by the organisation began to achieve a higher priority within 
their programme of action. 
The general objectives pursued during this period by the external mission were intended to 
complement the strategy being followed by the internal organisation. The primary activities of 
the external mission can be categorised as follows ".. . diplomatic relations, fund raising, 
information activities, and supportive service to the combatants" (Nelson, 1975:174). 
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On both the political and military fronts the ANC was almost wiped out inside South Africa in 
the early 1960's, Nelson Mandela was arrested in 1962, and the cream of its leadership, 
including Sisulu, Mbeki, Mhlaba, Kathrada, Motsoaledi, Mlangeni and others, in'a'police raid 
on Lilliesleaf farm in Rivonia, in 1963 (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Meli, 1988; Lodge, 
1988).The ANC underground structures inside South Africa according to Ellis and Sechaba 
(1988) were smashed, its members or sympathizers were either banned, detained, kept under 
police surveillance, harassed or otherwise neutralized.After 1963 the ANC was huddled in exile, 
its main leaders gone, only Oliver Tambo being considered paramount by virtue of having 
designated three years earlier as leader of the ANC External Mission. 
It could be propounded that this pre-Rivonia period demonstrated to ANC officials the 
difficulties of establishing an underground stmcture and implementing a campaign of violence 
within South Africa. But through their international activities the organisation achieved some 
success in Africa, and at the United Nations, however, there was little evidence that these efforts 
had had any meaningful impact on the South African Government's willingness to meet the 
desires of their non-white popUlation. 
The third stage of opposition in South Africa commenced with the aftermath of Rivonia. The 
strategy of the ANC during the post-Rivonia period moved its transitional phase into an open 
acceptance of violence (Nelson, 1975). The move into exile had other effects on the leadership 
of the ANC which became apparent over the passage of time. The organisation was cut off from 
its base of support inside South Africa and inevitably became more orientated towards 
international opinion (Ellis, 1991; Lodge, 1988). Ellis and Sechaba (1992) points out that 
Mpho Machesa 33 
without diplomatic and financial support from abroad, it would have ceased to exist at all other 
than as a fading memory. 
Thus, during this period, ANC diplomacy and international activities concentrated on pUblicising 
the injustice wrought by apartheid and effecting the isolation of South Africa (Nelson, 1975). 
Hence, the establishment of a Special Committee on Apartheid by the United Nations 
Organisation augured a new era of activism on behalf of the ANC interests by the international 
community (Lauren,1988), and resolutions condemning apartheid were on regular basis drafted 
by the world organisation, including a voluntary ban on arms sales passed in 1963 .by the United 
Nations Security Council. But despite the ANC's initial expectations, the United Nations 
Security Council categorically refused to take further substantive steps against South Africa 
(Alden, 1993). 
One recurring problem of the ANC whilst in exile, according to Lodge (1988) was to make itself 
manifest, particularly in the early 1960's. Thus, in an effort to re-Iaunch the armed struggle 
against South Africa, the best course available was to assist in the liberation of South Africa's 
neighbours as a prelude to an attack at close quarters and opening supply lines to South Africa 
(Ellis, 1991). Such an opportunity to establish military camps and offices in relative proximity 
was brought about by the decolonisation of Tanzania and Zambia. 
Thus, from their bases in Zambia, a series of military expeditions were launched into Rhodesia 
[now Zimbabwe] with combined Umkhonto we Sizwe cadres and Zimbabwe African People's 
Union (ZAPU) forces. But these expeditions encountered disaster at the hands of the Rhodesia 
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troops (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Meli, 1988). Alden (1993) pointed out that the Wankie 
campaign, as the events became known, underlined the shortcoming of the ANC's ill conceived 
military campaign to date. Ellis and Sechaba (1992) also concurs with this point by" reflecting 
that there is a puzzle about the exact conception of this campaign by the ANC. In the wake of 
twin disappointments with the United Nations and Western powers as well as the failure to restart 
the anned struggle, the ANC embarked on a maj or strategic and organisational reassessment at 
its 1969 Third Consultative Conference in Morogoro, Tanzania (Meli, 1988; Davis, 1987; 
Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Kotze, 1989). 
At this conference major organisational changes were introduced. The most important moments 
of the Conference were the adoption of the ANC's Policy Document, called Strategy and 
Tactics of the South African Revolution (Meli,1988), which precisely formulated and 
articulated the military theory and doctrine, and also provided a more refined explanation of the 
Freedom Charter (Kotze, 1989). Again the conference legislated that non-African members could 
join the organisation (Meli, 1988, Ellis and Sechaba, 1992), and the result was that members 
of the SACP, while previously were important partners in their coalition against the apartheid 
government, achieved virtually co-equal stature in the de-facto alliance. 
These overt alignments of the ANC with the SACP brought with it, three important changes in 
the following dimension: strategic, logistical, and ideological terms (Alden, 1993; Ellis and 
Sechaba, 1992) in regard to the conduct of the organisations foreign policy. In strategic 
terms, the formulation of the Revolutionary Council [the joint ANC-SACP executive body 
for administering the armed struggle] and the adoption of a Marxist-Leninist principle of 
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democratic centralism sharpened the decision-making powers of the organisation, in logistical 
terms, the resources of the Soviet Union[given to the SACP initially) were marshalled behind 
the ANC giving it unprecedented access to training and material, and in ideological terms, the 
alignments ushered an era of greater ideological cohesion between the Soviet Union and the ANC. 
Thus, the organization was able to analyse historical and political events through contextual 
frameworks and chronological interpretations to reflect the prism of marxist-leninism as 
proclaimed by Soviet Union ideology (Alden, 1993). Taken together, all these changes marked 
a significant transformation of ANC outlook to international politics and, thus, enabling the 
organisation to integrate itself fully within the framework of global ideological struggle of the 
Cold War era. 
By shifting away from the haphazard application of revolutionary means (Ellis and Sechaba, 
1992), coupled with the unsuccessful petition-orientation approach (Nelson, 1975), the 
organisation introduced rigorous long-term strategic plans, coordinating, reviving and enhancing 
military campaigns with a reinvigorated international sanctions campaign (Lodge, 1988; 
Thomas, 1990). The faith in the efficacy of this approach to bring down the apartheid 
government was to guide the organisation into the next tumultuous decade of the 1970's through 
to that of the 1980's. 
The collapse of the Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique in 1976 became a 
watershed event in the history of southern Africa (Meli, 1988). Thus with the establishment of 
avowedly marxist-leninist regimes in these countries, the cordon sanitaire of white settler states 
surrounding South Africa was irrevocably punctured (see: Meli, 1988:185; Ellis and Sechaba, 
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1992:76-77; Alden, 1993:66). For the ANC, the liberation of both these states meant that it can, 
for the first time since the early sixties, operate from a base of support contiguous with South 
Africa. .", 
During the same time-frame, inside South Africa itself, the revolutionary fervour unleashed by 
these examples of black liberation exploded in the Soweto uprising of 1976 (Davis, 1987; Meli, 
1988; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992) sparking a spontaneous rebellion of school children that marked 
the first significant anti-apartheid protest in over a decade. 
1his is not the place to describe the Soweto uprising and the momentous effect it had on politics. 
Suffice to mention that thousands of young South Africans, very angry and very militant, left 
South Africa to join the liberation movement abroad. Thus, the ANC was faced with the task of 
converting these militant and radical youths into loyal cadres, and this it did through a system of 
political education (Ellis, 1991). 
Imbued with a renewed sense of optimism, and bolstered by the overt commitment to activism 
in the Third World by the Soviet Union and its allies, Alden (1993) points out that the 
organisation recognised that these dramatic changes called for a re-evaluation of its strategy. 
Thus, according to Ellis (1991), a joint ANC/SACP mission was sent to the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam to gamer information from their experience in guerilla warfare and 
strategies. 
Building on the changes brought in the ANC strategy during the Morogoro Conference and the 
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influence that was gained from the Vietnamese legendary General Giap, the mission formulated 
a strategic plan for revolutionary conduct on the white-minority rule in South African in all 
fronts, and this was carried out in accordance with the "Four Pillars of Revolution", that is, 
First, all-round vanguard activity of the underground structures; second, 
the united mass action of the people; third, armed offensive, spearheaded 
by Umkhonto-we-Sizwe; and fourth, the international drive to isolate the 
apartheid regime and win world-wide moral, political and material support 
for the struggle. (Quoted in Alden, 1993) 
The flrst three components of this structured approach to foreign policy were politico-military 
in nature, the latter focused speciflcally on diplomacy.These components were to be 
operationalized through the implementation of a long-term strategy planning which commenced 
with the promulgation of "armed propaganda" and "political mobilization" in 1979, 
culminated in a "peoples war" by 1982 (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992). 
Thus, the systematic application of these strategic lessons, coupled with the development of 
renewed political activism within the country began to bear fruits . By 1983 an array of newly 
established civic organisations, trade unions and other groups formed a broad alliance of anti-
apartheid organisations under the auspices of the United Democratic Front (UDF) (Lodge, 
1988; Leach, 1986) to combat the proposed changes introduced by PW Botha's government. 
Opposition began to mount in the form of resistance to these proposed byzantine tricameral 
parliamentary schemes that tended to exclude black Africans. 
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While the liberation movement was engaged in channelling resources into the armed struggle, 
Barrat (1993) states that the South African regime took steps based on classical counter-
revolutionary strategies to thwart what it characterised as the "total onslaught" levelled against 
the state. And, among the actions taken, Alden (I993) stated that the SADF policy of regional 
destabilisation utilizing surrogate forces in neighbouring states to bring pressure to bear on 
governments hosting or supporting the ANC insurgency was instituted. 
Such a strategy, according to Chakaodza (1990), began in earnest after the inauguration of 
Ronald Reagan to the USA presidency in the 1980's and was eventually to succeed partially in 
its aims to defeat the ANC guerilla strategies. The result, as Lodge (1988) observed, was the 
proliferation of a series of non-aggression pacts, most notably with Swaziland in 1982, 
Mozambique in 1984. Against this backdrop, it can asserted that the loss of Mozambique as a 
staging area for ANC operatives was acutely felt by the organisation. However, the focus of the 
armed struggle shifted to Angola where training camps housed thousands of ANC guerillas 
(Lodge, 1988; Ellis, 1991; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992). 
The outbreak of sustained protest within South Africa, especially in the Vaal Triangle in the mid-
eighties, that rippled in quick succession re-invigorating the movement's political fortunes 
within the country. Thus, with the renewal of significant civil disobedience, Leach (1986) argued 
that the ANC's struggle against the regime entered a new phase as boycotts, protest marches and 
fiery funerals came to dominate the political landscape forcing the country to seethe with unrest. 
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Complimenting the rising pace of events within South Africa, was the hardening of international 
sentiments against the government. The ANC and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, according 
to Lodge (1988) gained strength in their efforts to isolate South Africa internationally by 
instigating for socio-economic sanctions. The continued failure by the government to introduce 
substantive reform, captured in Botha's "Rubicon" speech of August 1985 (Mills and 
Baynham, 1994) and sharpened by the deliberate scuttling of the Commonwealth's Eminent 
Persons Groups (EPG) mission in early 1986 by the SADF, pushed an increasingly impatient 
international community into action (Alden, 1993). Campaigns coupled with sit-in vigils at 
official South African offices in the United States, as Alden (1993) argued, culminated in the 
passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act by the United States COJIgYess in 1986. 
With the failure of the Commonwealth's negotiations initiative, British reluctance was overcome 
and punitive measures were endorsed (Barber and Barrat, 1990). As was the case, various other 
states all followed in imposing substantial economic, political and cultural sanctions against 
South Africa. 
Alden (1993) pointed out that the organisations high profile in international relations scored 
important victories during this period even though it was sustained ironically by the South 
African government's intransigence. The Commonwealth EPG mission shuttling between South 
African government officials, the ANC leadership in Lusaka [Zambia] and Commonwealth 
member states (Chakaodza, 1990), effectively put the organisation on the same diplomatic 
footing as the South Africa government. 
In its report, the Commonwealth mission did much to legitimise the movement internationally 
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by suggesting that" ... the organisation could emerge victorious in a non-restricted election" 
(Commonwealth EPG Report, 1986:135). Ministerial status accorded the organisations leader-
in-exile, Oliver Tambo, in his visits to the United States, European countries', Asian and 
African states also enhanced the movements position internationally. 
Again, this high profile international relations attainment by the organisation was demonstrated 
by the growth of its diplomatic mission during the period of exile, especially during the latter 
part of the 1980's. As compared to the small unit that was established in the early 1960's, Phillip 
(1989:16) observed that the ANC's Department of International Affairs managed to "establish over 
forty missions and a corps of diplomats. 
In addition to its permanent observer status at the United Nations, the organisation had 
representatives at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and at the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) (Johnston and Shezi, 1993:170). This means that the ANC could claim 
better representation internationally than the South African regime (Alden, 1993), such claims 
reinforced the notion that the ANC was the legitimate heir-apparent to the government in 
Pretoria. 
However, despite all these diplomatic successes, the organisation's expectations that the South 
African state would collapse with the onset of the township rebellion proved to be premature. 
The imposition of a nationwide state of emergency by mid-1980 and the introduction of counter-
revolutionary strategies by "securocrats" (price, 1991) in Pretoria, while certainly not 
eliminating opposition to the state, succeeded in stifling the effectiveness of an ANC's supported 
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internal uprising. 
Concurrently, Ellis and Sechaba (1992) noted that the government continued with'ifs policy of 
destabilization in Frontline states by trying to cripple or eliminate ANC's sources of support in 
the immediate region. The magnitude of these setbacks, as Alden (1993) reported, were reflected 
in the ANC's Politico-Military Councils sobering analysis not withstanding, there were changes 
in international political environment in the offing which were to eclipse altogether these events. 
Also, before the end of the 1980's a radical transformation in regional politics of southern Africa, 
driven by a sea-change in static international politics of the post-war period occurred. 
Thus, through the opportunity afforded by such radical transformations within the international 
and regional political setting and also bolstered by an increased ANC's conciliatory attitude 
towards a negotiated settlement, the South African government undertook to transform the 
domestic stalemate confronting the country. The sudden government's annulment of prohibition, 
shattered the historical die that have moulded the development of the organisations foreign policy 
orientation for over three decades in exile. 
3.4. Conclusion. 
In conclusion we can argue that the conflict between the ANC and the South African government 
achieved some prominence within the international political system. Central to this issue area 
was the element of race. The emphasis on race in South Africa was to distinguish the government 
from virtually all other states because the most crucial decision in virtually every sphere of life 
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were governed by the requirement of maintaining white rule. 
Thus, since its founding the ANC made this matter of racial discrimination its primary concern. 
But it was the re-invigoration of the organisation after 1960, that transformed the petition-
oriented elitism of the previous four and half decades, into an exiled revolutionary movement, 
that signalled a new era in South African politics by internationalising the issue of race 
discrimination through a rigorous foreign policy and diplomatic programme. 
Such a policy programme was premised on the existence of a substantial body of states in the 
international system which constituted a formidable pressure group challenging the legitimacy 
of the South African regimes authoritative rule. Subsequently, throughout its years of banning 
and exile, the organisation's foreign policy, with the support of the international community, was 
able to effect the elimination and isolation of the South African government from international 
activities of such acclaimed bodies such as the Commonwealth, United Nations, OAU and the 
Non-Aligned Movement. 
'Through its systematic efforts of its foreign policy conduct the organisation was able to command 
international support in instituting economic sanctions against the South African government. 
Therefore, the development of the ANC as an organisation and its foreign policy activities not 
only survived exile, but were strengthened by the experience that was to direct it into the post-
apartheid era. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EFFECTS INDUCED BY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. 
"External causes are the conditions of change and internal factors 
are the basis of change, and that external causes became operative 
through internal ones" 
Mao Tse Tung (1975).5 
4.1. Introduction. 
43 
This chapter will attempt to examine the nature and effects of the crisis induced by 
political developments within the international, regional and domestic political systems 
between the period 1989 and 1994. The chapter is divided into two sections, the first 
part will deal with the international and regional political perspectives while the latter 
part deals with the domestic perspective. And , an attempt will be made to explore the 
extent to which these political development perspectives led to the transformation of the 
foreign policy orientation of the ANC, especially its rapprochement towards the 
industrialised economies of the 'West'. 
It is truism that foreign policy of any given state or non-state actor is the product of both 
domestic and international political futures. The foreign policy orientation of the ANC 
5 Quoted in Samuel, S. Kim (ed): (1984) China and the World. Boulder, Westview Press . 
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is no exception to this. It could be pointed out that, going beyond such a jejune 
statement to develop theories explaining and predicting whether domestic or 
international factors dominates foreign policy transition has proved to be a difficult task 
and exercise for students of foreign policy and international relations. 
But such conceptual and theoretical quandary are relatively easy to explain. The 
domestic and international policies and politics of states and non-state actors are 
'linked' in a complex way. There is almost no aspect of a state's international policies 
that does not affect and reflect domestic interest based in societal._and/or state 
apparatus. 
Students of international politics and foreign policy studies argue that the international 
system has had a decisive impact on the transition of the ANC's foreign policy 
orientation in recent years, if not throughout its political history. Whether they adopt for 
analysis the international systematic theory of Kenneth Waltz, the world-system 
theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, or a theory of international political economy of 
the dependency school 6 tend to view ANC's foreign policy transition as being 
fundamentally structured by international forces. 
They further proposed that the international and regional systems transform and 
6 See respectively the study of Kenneth Waltz (1979) Theory of International Relations. 
Reading, Addison-Wesley; Immanuel Wallerstein (1979) The Capitalist World-Economy. 
Cambridge, University Press; Cardoso, F Hand Fuletto , E (1979) Dependency and 
Development in Latin America. Berkeley, University Press . 
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structured foreign policy orientation and behaviour through two principle ways, that 
is , through the operation of the international balance of power or more generally the 
quest for security and the operation of the international political economy. 
4.2. International and Regional Perspective. 
The anti-colonial revolution which followed World War II , created a multitude of new 
states, mostly small in size, economically underdeveloped and politically weak 
(Narayanan, 1981). It was out of such common denominator that they adopted an 
international orientation of non-alignment politics (Singham and Hune, 1986) . . 
These developments of non-aligned politics evolved against the backdrop of Cold-War 
era, a period in which strong pressure was put on these newly independent Third World 
countries to align themselves with either of the two superpowers in world politics. Thus, 
a meeting of about twenty-nine Third World states plus a host of liberation movements 
took place in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, however, a formal agreement was only 
constituted in Belgrade, in 1961 (Narayanan, 1981). A year after the ANC was forced 
into exile, and one of the first international meetings it attended as an exiled movement 
(Nelson, 1975). According to Thomas (1990:299) ..... the ANC declared itself non-
aligned and committed" at these non-aligned conference. Such a declaration was 
made because of the common and similar struggles against colonialism, against 
international peace, against racial equality and national independence remonstrated 
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by the non-aligned member-states. 
Consequently, due to the overt-alliance that existed between the ANC and the South 
African Communist Party (SACP), whilst in exile, Fourie (1992) argued that the ANC 
compromised one of the founding principles of the Non-Aligned Movement, that of, 
independence from the superpowers and their power struggles. Such an alliance 
brought two important dimensions with it: logistical and ideological dimensions. In 
logistical terms, Ellis and Sechaba (1992) contend that all the material and financial 
resources made available to the SACP by the Soviet Union were marshalled behind the 
ANC thus giving it unprecedent access to much needed military hardware and 
equipment. And, they further purported that in ideological terms, it ushered an era of 
greater ideological cohesion between the ANC and the USSR. 
Such an ideological cohesion was clearly displayed by the ANC memorandum on 
"What We Understand by Non-Alignment" presented at the Cairo Summit, 
portraying a pro-Soviet Union view, opposing western imperialism as led by the USA 
and comparing the South African regime's aggressive policies in southern Africa to that 
of the interventionist tendencies of the USA in Third World states (Fourie, 1992), as 
both policies were justified as part of the fight against communism. Therefore, Thomas 
(1990) inferred that such a close alignment with the USSR tainted the ANC's 
commitment to peace, as it neglected to criticise the Soviet Union's invasion of 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. 
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Although, there is little evidence of the commonly held idea that the ANC actually 
supported these invasions. But during the recent disputes in Yugoslavia, Persian Gulf, 
Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Burundi , however, the ANC stuck itself to the 
commitment of the permeable of the Non-Aligned Movement and that of its Freedom 
Charter to strive for world peace and the settling of international disputes by 
negotiation, not war. 
The ascent to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union in March ·1985 brought 
reformist attitude in policy conduct and application (Alden, 1993). Such a conducts was 
affirmed by the 27th Communist Party Congress in 1986 which bluntly stated that the 
Soviet Union policy conduct was to be characterized by a ' new thinking' which will be 
more 'pragmatic, realistic and less ideological' (Porzgen, 1991). 
In an interview with Novoe Vremja, a Soviet Union foreign politics magazine, the Soviet 
Foreign minister, Edvard Shevardnadze lamented that " .. , our priority is to create 
the most suitable conditions for an economic transformation and political 
flexibility within our country" (Porzegen, 1991 :165), Similar sentiments were echoed 
by Sergie Shatalov of the Moscow African Institute who noted that" .. , an economic 
epoch of Soviet Union assistance to Africa and the liberation movements is 
drawing to a close" (Friedman and Narsoo, 1989), 
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Such policy sentiments were to become evident by the reluctance of the Soviet Union 
leadership to expel South Africa from the International Atomic Energy ~Agency 
(IAEA), as called by Nigeria and other Third World states, and as demanded by the 
ANC (Porzegen, 1991). Actually, the Soviet Union voted together with socialist 
countries and the United States not to exclude South Africa. This was the first public 
and official signal of a disagreement between the ANC and the Soviet leadership. 
Boris Piljatskin wrote in an article in the Moscow News in 1988 that ..... for years the 
Soviet Union have been looking at the situation in South Africa through the eyes 
of the ANC" (Kuhne, 1988). However, such sentiments did not mean a break with the 
ANC. Hence, Phillip (1989) mention that close relationship were confirmed in official 
statements, and as a token of diplomatic recognition the Soviet Union allowed for the 
ANC to open a consular mission in Moscow at the beginning of 1989. 
But there was new speculation about worsening relations with the ANC. According to 
Porzegen (1991) these became vivid, when Oliver Tambo visited Soviet Union in mid-
1989 as head of the ANC delegation and was not welcomed by General-Secretary 
Gorbachev himself in contrast to his visit in 1986. But, it can be pointed out that Soviet 
Union policy remained ambivalent, following major political changes in South Africa 
since 1990. Such a steadfast approach could be attributed to the drastic alteration of 
the pattern of power and conflict which shaped international relations for many 
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decades. 
The central feature of this new phase was a substantial easing of Cold War tensions. 
Johnston and Shezi (1993). points out that the pattern of global politics can no longer 
be interpreted in terms of bipolar rivalry between the USSR and the USA. Thus, the 
political events that evolved within the international political system became a threshold 
for a new era in world political affairs. 
Evans (1991) mourned that a new tide was sweeping away the vestige of cold war 
politics based on East-West rhetoric. Such a radical transformation of the international 
environment which accompanied the ending of the Cold War, according to Johnston 
and Shezi (1993) sent shock waves through liberation movements and socialist 
countries alike. Lodge (1992) suggested that the world which the ANC would confront 
as a government had changed from that which it confronted as a banned and exiled 
movement. 
Hence, Alden (1993) contend that the sudden collapse of the communist states in 
Eastern Europe, the reintegration of the two Germanys, followed by the breakup of the 
Soviet Union removed the economic, military and ideological support which had 
sustained the ANC and its allies since the onset of the armed struggle. Against such a 
backdrop, developments within the international pol itical setting thus simultaneously 
forced the ANC's hand in its policy conduct. 
• 
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Consequently, the politics of the southern Africa region that evolved during the same 
time frame as the events in global politics also proved decisive in determining the 
nature of the foreign policy conduct of the organization. Thus, the main attention in 
regional politics, however, was focused on conflicts in Angola and Namibia. 
By the end of 1987, the Angolan MPLA-government, with Cuban support and more 
strongly armed than in 1986 (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992; Stiff, 1991), renewed their 
offensive against UNITA. However, the offensive was repulsed with the help of South 
African military support (Alden, 1993), the SADF claimed that on this occasion its 
support was explicitly limited. The South African regime issued an official statement 
stating that the limited military action ..... was taken against surrogate forces 
[Cubans and Russians] to prevent MPLA control of Cuando-Cubango Province 
[Angola] which could give SWAPO and the ANC greater freedom of movement, 
thus increasing terrorist threat to South West Africa territory [Namibia] and the 
Republic of South Africa" (Barber and Barrat, 1990:342). 
Fighting in Cuando-Cubango province continued in the early months of 1988 around 
the key town of Cuito Cuanavale (Stiff, 1991). But eventual military stalemate was 
followed by a new round of negotiations which began formally in a meeting in London 
between South African , Angolan and Cuban officials, with Chester Crocker, 
Assistant Secretary for African Affai rs in the United States government (Alden 
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1993), as chairman and mediator. The London meeting was the first of a long series -
held in Cairo, Brazzaville, Geneva and New York - which continued until Hle end of 
1988. 
These protracted negotiations, focused on the Cuban presence in Angola and 
Namibian independence. Barber and Barrat (1990) points out that the United States 
continued to playa prominent mediating role and was encouraged by the USSR with 
its new spirit of 'glasnost' and its policy of disengagement from regional conflict. ·Stiff 
(1991) inferred that Pretoria's greater readiness to look for a settlement was 
influenced by new developments. This, includes military experiences in Angola where 
UNITA, assisted by the SADF, had been undefeated but unable to dislodge large 
Cuban and Angolan forces using sophisticated weapons and a major move by the 
Cubans into the southern Cunene province threatened the hydroelectric scheme on 
the Cunene River bordering Namibian territory, as well as the South African military's 
inability to counter SWAPO activities in Namibia. Vale (1991) also conceded to the 
fact that there was South African white concern over the escalating conflict, the costs 
of war, the occupation of Namibia, a weak economy and over imposed international 
economic sanctions. 
In the negotiations, the linkage between withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola and 
Namibian independence was accepted and the three governments agreed on a 
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'fourteen principles for a peaceful settlement in south-western Africa' (Stiff, 1991; 
Alden, 1993). These principles includes the full implementation of United CNations 
Resolution 435 leading to Namibian independence and the withdrawal of foreign 
armies in Angola. The prospects for a settlement seemed much better than at any time 
in the past because it served the differing interests of the major parties involved - USA, 
USSR, Angola, South Africa and Cuba. 
According to Barber and Barrat (1990) there was uncertainty-. about Cuban's 
willingness to agree to a withdrawal timetable acceptable to Pretoria and Washington. 
However, such a threat as pointed out by Hamill (1990), was balanced by the positive 
international response to the prospects of peace in the region , especially due to the 
Soviet Union pragmatic policy toward southem Africa regional conflicts. Thus, towards 
the end of 1988, the three govemments - South Africa, Angola and Cuba - signed a 
protocol in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, which was formalised by a treaty signed 
at the United Nations in New York in December 1988. 
The New York Accord set the start of the implementation of the United Nations 
Resolution 435, which embodied the parameters for the withdrawals of Cuban troops 
in Angola and South African Defense Force units in Angola and Namibia (Ellis and 
Sechaba, 1992; Stiffi, 1991). And, the Accord also made provisions for a cease-fire 
leading to a general election between the Angolan government and UNITA as well as 
similar United Nations brokered undertaking in Namibia (Croker, 1992). Namibia was 
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moving towards a negotiated settlement and these have dramatically raised both hopes 
and fears in many liberation struggle quarters, including the ANC (Philllps and 
Coleman, 1989). 
For the ANC, the really full magnitude of these changes came with the signing of the 
New York Accord (Alden, 1993; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992). Because a key, if 
unwritten in the provision of the New York Accord, which Pretoria was able to tie to the 
agreement [including termination of its support to UNIT A] was the closure of ANC 
military bases situated in central and northern Angola and the removal of its Umkhonto 
we Sizwe (MK) troops from Angola (Mills and Baynham, 1994:32; Ellis and Sechaba, 
1992:191). Such regional factors coupled with a change in international political terrain, 
greatly altered the parameters within which the ANC was to develop its foreign policy. 
4.3. Domestic Perspective. 
This section will attempt to show how domestic factors in South Africa has indirectly or 
directly influenced the transition of the foreign policy conduct of the ANC. I will try to 
develop an interpretation of the post-1990 domestic politics that might explain why 
domestic issues and factors have tended to equally dominate the shaping and transition 
of the ANC foreign pol icy conduct. 
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This has been particularly true since the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, especially in 
its talks with the South African regime, in trying to put pressure on the international 
community to maintain economic sanctions, its continuation to propagate tne armed 
struggle, its rhetoric to nationalise the economic power structures in order to serve the 
socio-economic needs and interest of the majority of the South African populace as 
opposed to the military, security apparatus. 
Thus, against this backdrop, the section will examine briefly the static political changes 
of the 1990's in South Africa, the evolving character of the ANC leadership.in the post-
1990, ANC's efforts to maintain sanctions and its efforts to re-address the socio-
economic inequalities. 
It is argued that a recurrent theme in analysing South African political situation has long 
been the claim that the National Party regime and the apartheid system were on the 
brink of imminent collapse (Murray,1994). But, Selfe (1989) proposed that despite 
repeated prediction of such cataclysmic breakdowns by 'five-minutes-to-midnight' 
prophecies, the dominant political class continued to survive and, at times, even gain 
new strength in spite of its manifest weakness. 
But, Murray (1994) contend that it was the combination of capital flight, the drying up 
of international loans that starved local enterprises of investment funds, coupled with 
internal mass activity, the strength of political forces on the ground, the organized trade 
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unions boycotts, the massive strength of the mass democratic movements, the political 
awareness among the majority of black South Africans and the mounting international 
and regional demands (Chakaodza, 1990) also put enormous pressure on the 
apartheid political elite to arrive at a workable solution to the long-standing political crisis 
of legitimacy, representation and rule. 
Thus, in a landmark address, President F.W . de Klerk ended speculation about the 
willingness of the National Party leadership to steer a reformist course by announcing 
sweeping reform changes in the political landscape of the Republic of.-6outh Africa 
(Chakaodza, 1990; Alden, 1993; Murray, 1994; Mills and Baynham, 1994; Thomas, 
1994). It be could reiterated that the immediate objective of De Klerk's announcement 
was to break the political impasse that had developed after months of semi-secret 
discussions with the ANC by removing the remaining pol itical stumbling blocks to 
nascent negotiations over a proposed new constitution. 
In analysing such political reforms, Thomas (1994) states that such a striking volte-face 
in the political direction of the ruling Nationalist Party caught nearly everyone off guard 
, 
at the time. However, it can be pointed out that in breaking the political logjam, 
governments of the international community greeted with a degree of enthusiasm 
bordering on euphoria the opening of political dialogue on how to include the 
disenfranchised majority into the mainstream political process. The unbanning of the 
ANC by the South African regime , as Alden (1993) conceded shattered the die which 
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had moulded the foreign policy of the organization for over three decades. 
According to Bachman (1984), individual political leaders bring many diverse concerns 
and attributes in making policy decisions on foreign relation matters. Such includes the 
conceptual equipment they carry with them that enables to perceive and comprehend 
political developments [perceptual processes and ideological predispositions], their 
previous political experience and personal goals [such as power, prestige and more 
negatively political survival]. Initially, the organization leadership in attempting to fix 
these radical developments in South African politics within the paradigm of the liberation 
struggle, according to Alden (1993) sought to conceptualize events in terms familiar to 
them and to retain support from their established constituencies during the transition 
period. 
As circumstances demonstrated, Lodge (1992) argued that the contradictions between 
the residual imperatives of the liberation politics and those of the dynamics of the 
negotiation process within the larger context of the new international, regional and 
domestic environment proved to be problematic. And, the result, according to Hayson 
(1992) was the promulgation of an inconsistent approach to foreign diplomacy which 
echoed both the rhetoric and the tactics of the recent past. One which Alden (1993) 
perceived as been met with criticism from a formerly receptive international audience. 
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Notwithstanding the rhetoric of ANC leadership and efforts to develop coherent 
constitutional procedures , the evolving character of the organization leadership in the 
post-1990 period in regard to foreign policy conduct, as Lodge (1992) inferred, begins 
with one man, Nelson Mandela. His own intelligence, courage and honour, the moral 
authority his name commanded within the domestic, regional and international political 
setting (Lodge, 1992) became an instrument employed by the organization to pursue 
its objectives through the course of the negotiation (Alden, 1993), to restore its rapidly 
deteriorating influence on the international communities' sanctions policy and restore 
its foreign policy image (Thomas, 1994; Johnston and Shezi, 1993). ,,' 
It could then be pointed out that the personal prestige of Nelson Mandela as an 
evolving character of the organization leadership coupled with his political concerns for 
black political legitimation, representation and rule (Lodge, 1992), all induced 
by democratic ideals that will help to inflict a pernicious system of iniquity (Murray, 
1994) on South Africa, are believed to be clouded indirectly or directly in influencing the 
organization policy conduct and orientation. 
As a process of dialogue between states, Watson (1982) critique that diplomacy is one 
of the main instruments of foreign policy conduct. But for liberation movements, 
diplomacy, as Thomas (1994) inferred, became the pursuit of the armed struggle by 
other means. This was clearly the case for the ANC. Thus, after its unbanning , the 
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organization waged a diplomatic campaign to publicise and inform the world community 
that 'apartheid is still in place' in South Africa (Johnston and Shezi, 1993), and 
requesting the international community to maintain economic sanctions ·.until the 
objective to attain a democratic South Africa are fulfilled (Tjonneland, 1992; Thomas, 
1994). 
As a prerequisite for engaging in direct negotiations, the ANC issued a set of pre-
conditions embodied in the Harare Declaration, endorsed by the OAU's ad-hoc 
Committee on Southern Africa and the Frontline States at a specic,tLmeeting in 
Harare [Zimbabwe] in August 1989 (Thomas, 1994; Alden, 1993; South African 
Barometer, 1990; SAIIA Report, 1990). One of the preamble guidelines endorsed by 
these documents was the agreement that the international community would lift 
sanctions after the imposition of a new constitution in South Africa (SA Barometer, 
1990; SAIIA Report, 1990). But the rate in which the debate on economic sanctions 
changed indicated how the release of Mandela and the unbanning of political 
organizations undermined the ANC's influence (Chakaodza, 1990). The debate within 
the international community shifted from the intensification of sanctions to conditions 
necessary for their removal. 
Thus, sensing its increasing isolation, according to Thomas (1994) the ANC embarked 
on a diplomatic campaign by dispatching Nelson Mandela on a worldwide tour to 
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defend the restoration of economic sanctions policies. But Mandela's call for vigilance 
on sanctions to counter South African government pleas for their removal ·.;net with 
growing scepticism amongst Western and Asian leaders for whom economic issues had 
come to eclipse ethical considerations of the recent past (Alden, 1993; Geldenhuys, 
1990). 
In the case of international bodies such as the United Nations and the 
Commonwealth, ANC diplomacy on sanctions continued to maintain its .,~ffectiveness. 
Thus, following the ANC's lead, the United Nations General Assembly passed a 
resolution urging all countries to restore sporting, cultural, scientific and academic 
exchanges with South Africa in light of the progress achieved there (see: Thomas, 
1994:180; Alden, 1993:73). And, at the Commonwealth summit meeting in October 
1991, the member states agreed to lift academic and cultural prohibitions but elected 
to retain economic sanctions until a transitional government was in place (Anyaoku, 
1993), all of this in line with the ANC's wishes. But, despite all these success with the 
multi-lateral organizations, ANC foreign policy and diplomatic conduct experienced 
some unexpected setback in the middle of 1990. According to Alden (1993), numerous 
Western and Asian governments publicly developed a cosy relationship with Pretoria 
justified their decision by indicating that the de Klerk government should be rewarded 
for embarking on change, in the same spirit as when sanctions were employed to 
punish South African apartheid actions. 
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In spite of ANC objection to such statements, the European Community unilaterally 
withdrew its obstacles to new investment in South Africa, and the United States 
government scrapped sanctions imposed by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 
of 1986 and indicated its unwillingness to end the prohibitions of International 
Monetary Fund loans to South Africa and Japan also followed suit (Thomas, 1994). 
African states such as Zambia and Tanzania, Nigeria, at one time among the most 
vocal supporters of the ANC, had eagerly sought out contact with the South African 
. ..... ,.~.-
government (Alden, 1993) and, perhaps, most disturbing of all , the former communist 
states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were openly denouncing many 
of the very measures which formed the backbone of traditional ANC policy and were 
themselves actively courting De Klerk's government (Johnston and Shezi, 1993; 
Alden, 1993). The mere fact that Mandela's proposed visit to the Soviet Union was 
twice cancelled, allegedly due to the fact that the Kremlin wished to meet with de Klerk 
first, underscored the radical changes in the ANC's relationship with what used to be 
referred to as the 'Soviet Bloc' (Alden, 1993). 
Underlying these setbacks was the failure of the ANC to recognize that both the 'new 
terrain of the struggle' [negotiations) (Hayson, 1992) and the changed international 
environment (Johnston and Shezi, 1993) required a significant reappraisal of its 
overall approach to foreign policy conduct. But, at its National Consultative 
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Conference, Durban, July 1991 (ANC, 1991 b), the ANC began the difficult process 
of re-assessing its foreign policy approaches and content on a number of pressing 
national issues. 
Regional commitments - a long staple feature of ANC foreign policy - received 
considerable attention. But for the first time, the task of domestic reconstruction 
assumed a larger place on the ANC agenda (ANC, 1991). Hence, Pahad (1993) 
pointed out that the patent inability of the organization to stem the erosion of sanctions 
and the concurrent proliferation of official contacts between the . ~.?~th African 
government and a growing number of states in the international community had 
stimulated fears that the sanctions weapon was in danger of being rendered obsolete. 
Thus , a new policy emphasizing the phased withdrawal of sanctions subject to ANC 
approval was promulgated. As a preliminary step, selective lifting of sanctions in the 
area of 'people-to-people' contacts were favoured (ANC, 1991a; Mayibuye, 1991). 
Such includes provisions for the lifting of all sanctions - except those on military 
equipment and oil - with the installation of an interim government of national unity 
(Johnston and Shezi, 1993). However, due to a deterioration in the economic index, 
a high increase in unemployment levels and a spread of violence, the ANC recognized 
a need to promote stability and economic growth. 
However, in detecting that the connotation of sanction diplomacy as a policy conduct 
are becoming to be purported as obsolete, Nelson Mandela, as president of the ANC, 
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in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1993, blatantly 
informed the world community that sanctions should be " ... lifted to strengthen the 
forces of democratic change and to help create the necessary conditions for 
economic stability and social progress (Thomas, 1994:185)". 
It could be argued that the overriding focus of the struggle had remained steadfast to 
racial oppression, the apartheid system and exclusive white minority rule. But as the 
euphoria accompanying its legal existence, international victories and political gains 
quickly dissipated, as pointed out by Lodge (1994) the ANC was confrOl'lted with the 
world of Realpolitik. 
Thus, the organization readily became aware that the achievement of political equality 
in an undivided South Africa was anterior to addressing socio-economic inequalities 
(Murray, 1994). The precise manner in which the ANC proposed to carry out the 
redistribution of socio-economic resources was never clearly spelled out, apart from a 
cluster of salient propositions contained in the 1955 Freedom Charter. 
More often than not, when pressed by outsiders regarding readdressing of the socio-
economic imbalances, invoked these salient propositions, such as, the nationalization 
of the mines, banks and industries 'to the ownership of the people as a whole and 
wholesale land reform (Star, 1991)'. In 1990 January, Mandela reaffirmed these 
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tenets when he proclaimed that the 'nationalization of the mines, banks, and 
monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC and a change or modification of this 
views is inconceivable (Sowetan, 1990)'. 
The most important and substantial pronouncement of ANC's economic thinking was 
contained in the 1990 Discussion Document on Economic Policy (Transformation, 
1990). The main purpose of this policy statement was to provide a preliminary 
explanation for South Africa economic stagnation and to offer a tentative framework for 
economic recovery to address the socio-economic inequalities (ANC, 1993). 
Such an ambitious plan for economic recovery was to be pivoted on the premise that 
economic choices could not be divorced from political ones. The premium mobile that 
anchored such an alternative economic recovery strategy was termed 'growth through 
redistribution' where redistribution act as a spur to economic growth and in which the 
fruits of growth are to be redistributed to satisfy the basic social and economic needs 
of South Africans (Nattras, 1992; Tjonneland, 1992). 
But, Terreblanche (1992) argued that these 'growth through redistribution' concept 
has three slightly different variants: it demands 'redistribution to stimulate 
employment' , it will promote 'commandist-style state interventionism [macro-
economic populism]' grounded in selective nationalization and the dismantling of the 
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huge conglomerates, and encourage 'inward industrialization' to act as the prime 
stimulus triggering sustained economic growth. Established economists and 
mainstream policy-makers also subjected this alternative economic strategy to'blistering 
criticism. Suggesting that the untested formulas upon which the ANC's reformist 
initiatives rested would invariably be counterproductive, ineffectual and too expensive 
to sustain (Saul, 1991b). Furthermore, the ANC leadership came under relentless 
pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (OBSA), and the Consultative Business 
Movement (CBM) to abandon its proposed inward industrialization · programme in 
favour of a more 'realistic investment-led, export-oriented' growth economic strategy 
(Nattras,1992). 
The relentless pressure of South Africa 's free-enterprise lobby paid handsome 
dividends at the end for the proponents of laissez fa ire state policies (Morris, 1991). 
As one ANC economist acknowledged, that the ..... strengthened hand of the free 
market lobby in our own national economic debate forced the ANC to rethink its 
prior endorsement of state-managed solutions to long standing structural 
inequalities (Africa Confidential, 1994:4)". It could be pointed out such statements 
were visible signs that the ANC leadership had reached some sort of accommodation 
with the capital ist goals of rejuvenating economic profitability, and improving 
productivity. 
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Both at home and abroad, Nelson Mandela made a series of significant gestures 
towards big business (Africa Business, 1993; Shepard, 1993), and these strongly 
indicated that the ANC had embraced the market-governed logic of the free-enterprise 
system. Hence, the twin objectives of restoring business confidence and attracting 
foreign investment in order to address the socio-economic inequalities swamp all other 
directions (Tjonneland, 1992). Though it was not so easy for the organisation to 
abandon a foreign 'economic' policy strategy espousing a 'commandist-style' 
approach, international pressure and domestic socio- economic imbalances compelled 
the organisation to shift from such policy rhetoric and embrace a realistic investment 
led, export-oriented growth strategy comfortable for Western economic interest. 
4.4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter set out to investigate how international, regional and 
domestic developments influenced transformations in the ANC foreign policy 
perspectives. We have in the process shown that internal domestic sources such as a 
,change in static politics of South Africa , the evolving character of the organisation 
leadership, tireless campaigns to maintain economic sanctions and efforts to attend to 
socio-economic national issues, all had an impact on the ANC foreign policy conduct. 
Such internal political determinants coupled with external perspectives led the 
organisation to redefine its policy approaches and conduct to the dynamics of 
realpolitik. 
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It could be concluded that conditions active within the international systematic 
determinants re-affirm the primacy of the working of the domestic factors in policy 
change and conduct of any polity. Hence, a plausible approach that include·s internal 
sources and factors as part of the determinants in analysing foreign policy transition 
should be a acceptable analysis because policy transition is 'linked' in a complex way, 
for it is a product of both the internal and external political factors. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONTOURS FOR POST-APARTHEID FOREIGN POLICY 
" ... we will build a system of international relations which is not only 
confined to professionals and governments, but also from people to 
people, and that ought to be one of the objectives of our foreign 
policy". 
(Thabo Mbeki, November 1993) 
5.1. Introduction. 
67 
In order to analyse the possible future direction and conduct of the 'new' South African 
foreign policy, it is imperative to explore the preliminary contours of the proposed ANC's 
post-apartheid policy options and orientation. 
Thus, this chapter enunciates to determine the potential and probable disposition of the 
ANC by critiquing the organization post - apartheid policy orientations and priorities as 
contained in its International Affairs document (Working Group: International 
Relations) as far as South Africa reintegration into the world economic and political 
system. 
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Against this backdrop, it could be proposed that the central assumption in this chapter 
will be to attempt a discussion of what the 'new' South African foreign policy is likely to 
look like. It will straddle on some of the areas of policy priorities and controversy. 
However, the purpose here is not to formulate a fine - tuned foreign policy for a 'new' 
South Africa, neither formulating a comprehensive study on the complexities and the 
dimensions of foreign policy and South Africa's external relations. 
But to provide an overview of the many components of its international relations, foreign 
policy objectives and priorities which will warrants future attention of policy dimensions. 
On which the 'new' South African government and all its extensions might need to 
consider, and possibly expand upon. 
5.2. ANC's Post - Apartheid Foreign Policy Priorities. 
It can be conceded that foreign policy reflect underlying predispositions, fears and 
general attitude towards the international arena. Hence, it is specific and particular as 
it connote and lead to distinct behaviour (Wilkinson, 1969). In this regard it can be 
defined as ..... the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions 
suitable to their state and of the functions their states should perform in a variety 
of geographic and issue settings (Holsti, 1983:116)". It can also be summarised as 
..... perception of a nations positions in the international system (Wish, 1980:532)" 
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or a perception that ..... straddles two politico environments" (Evans, 1991 :715). 
In effect, it refers to the perception and dispositions, and not the seemingly apparent 
explanation for policy behaviour. Hence, it can be held by a non-state actor of the status 
of an organization like the ANC, and can be expected to be representative of a certain 
intended domestic political behaviour and also of actual policy orientation and conduct. 
The ANC maintained that " ... The Freedom Charter is the strategic foundation of its 
foreign policy"(Mayibuye, 1991 :39). Although the Charter was principally and 
basically a statement of an ideal domestic political aspirations (Fourie, 1992; 
Tjonneland, 1992) rather than a enumeration of priorities. The international orientations 
contained in this document have always been regarded as principles from which any 
deviation would be difficult. But, Tjonneland (1992) asserted that foreign policy is not 
always overtly defined and expressed, often it have to be deduced and inferred from 
the actual relations of the political actor. 
Fourie (1993) propagated that foreign policy is formulated independent from outside 
interference because an active independent policy approach involves more than a mere 
asserting of independence, but demands also a more diplomatic activity. As Holsti 
(1970) pronounced, it includes an active programme aimed at establishing a wide 
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range of political and economic relations with diverse area of the world. 
Thus, the ANC has long maintained that a democratic South Africa ..... shall oe a fully 
independent state which respects the right and sovereignty of nations (ANC, 
1994)". And, that "diplomatic relations will be established with all countries 
regardless of their social and political systems on the principles of mutual 
respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity 
(Sechaba, 1985:9)". One of the major aim of the ANC's struggle is to ensure that the 
people of South Africa can determine their own destiny, and believes that it is important 
that this right be maintained. Mbeki (1994a) stressed that the organization cannot 
compromise the country political independence in order to maintain friendly relations 
with other countries. But will maintain a non-aligned approach and establish relations 
with both the 'East' and the 'West' (Mbeki, 1991; 1994a). 
In its document, International Affairs (ANC, 1994), the ANC expressed its intention to 
engage in diplomatic relations with countries of the world. It states explicitly that a 
democratic South Africa will accept the importance of the world of peace in the Middle 
East and understand the importance of a sound mutually beneficial relationship with the 
Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference and, other important cultural 
and religious organizations. South Africa's economic relations will also seek to extend 
friendship with Asian and Oceanic countries, and regional organization. In 
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mapping relation with European countries, attention will focus on the European 
Community (EC) to negotiate mutually-beneficial trade and co-operation agreement 
with the EC and the nations of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in order 
to secure reasonable access to global markets. The organization will seek bilateral 
relations with the North American countries (United States, Canada and Mexico) 
and urge these countries as they move towards the establishment of the North 
America Free Trade Area (NAFTA), to give special attention to the concerns of 
developing countries, like South Africa. 
The ANC believe that a democratic South Africa will co-operate with United States in 
global fora and promote a multilateral role in defining the 'new' world order (ANC, 
1994). And, it will work to promote political, economic and developmental links with 
Latin American and Caribbean nations. But, Fourie (1993) inferred that even though 
the organization values South Africa's political independence, it does not intend to play 
a pacifist role in international relations and diplomacy. 
A proportionally large section of contemporary states mostly enunciate that their 
governments pursue to develop an adherence to the principle of self-determination and 
respect for independence (Holsti, 1983). Thus, in its belief of being in line to the agreed 
and accepted universal principles of independence and self-determination. The ANC 
Freedom Charter acknowledges the right of the people of Africa to independence 
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and self-government (Polley, 1989), and this is regarded as the basis of close-
friendship and co-operation with the continent of Africa. 
In this view, Mandela (1993) affirms that South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. 
For this reason, the ANC believes that the essence of foreign policy conduct is to 
promote and protect the interests and values of its citizens. But recognizes that the 
security and prosperity of South African people and their yearning for a stable non-
racial , non-sexist democracy also lies close to its relation with the African continent 
(ANG,1994). 
Thus, the organization's goal for a 'new' democratic South Africa is to gain re-
admission to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to augment in its goals to forge 
the unity of Africa's people (ANG,1994). It will actively involve South Africa in the 
promotion of both co-operation and regional economic integration, the objectives of 
democracy, peace, stability, mutually beneficial co-operation among the people of 
Africa as well as a pan-African solidarity (ANG, 1994; Mbeki, 1994b). 
Against this backdrop, Salim Ahmed Salim (1994) postulated that the OAU is looking 
forward to the 'new' South Africa as becoming a powerful addition to the African family 
of nations, and expects South Africa with its economic power, scientific and 
technological know-how and expertise to spearhead economic development in the 
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continent. Thus, strengthening Africa's hand in the international political and economic 
system. Legum (1993) affirms this position by stating that a democratic South Africa 
will make a major contribution in strengthening the role of the OAU in fqcing the 
multifarious challenges facing the continent. 
By perceiving itself as a regional leader, Holsti (1987) postulates that, a state feels it 
has certain distinct obligations and responsibilities towards other states within a specific 
region within which it identifies. In his observation, Fourie (1993) asserts that many 
regions of the world have natural and clearly definable leaders, militarily or 
.. ~ .. -.. 
economically, most of whom perceive themselves also as such. Good examples of this 
tendency are the United States in North America, Germany in Western Europe, 
Japan and Communist China in Asia, Russia (former Soviet Union) in Eastern 
Europe, India in the Indian Ocean littoral, Nigeria in West Africa, Egypt and Libya 
in the Maghreb, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America and South Africa in 
Southern Africa. 
Thus, Holsti (1983) postulates that, such tendencies often originate as a result of 
relatively superior capabilities and a traditionally powerful standing in the region. 
Consequently, the ANC acknowledges the fact that South Africa is the dominant power 
in Southern Africa. Hence, they believe that '". the struggling people of Southern 
Africa occupy a unique position which places special responsibilities on our 
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shoulder' (Sechaba, 1977) and that ' ... the movement have a special relationship 
with the peoples of Southern Africa, all of whom have suffered under apartheid' 
(ANC, 1994). But in its expression, the movement is more interested in regional peace, 
co-operation and friendship than in South Africa's strong regional position. 
Mandela (1993) argued that Southern African will only prosper if the principle of equity 
would be a tenet to inform its future. Thus, regional co-operation has to be viewed as 
a connection to mutually beneficial development and security (ANC Report, 1991). 
In forging links with its neighbours, the ANC believes that a democratic, non-racial and 
non-sexist South Africa as a member of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), affiliate ofthe Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade 
Area (PTA), will actively promote the objectives of democracy, peace, stability, 
development, mutually beneficial co-operation among the people of the southern 
African sub-continent (ANC, 1994; Mandela, 1993; Mbeki, 1994a). 
Likewise, the movement intends to involve post-apartheid South Africa in the process 
of reforming the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), because the current 
modus operandi is far from satisfactory (ANC, 1994; Mandela, 1993). The 
organization will seek to democratize the institutions of SACU, within the framework of 
a broader regional program, and to remove barriers in the existing arrangement to a 
more balanced location of industries (Mandela, 1993). 
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According to Mandela (1993), a democratic South Africa will not adopt a narrow, 
chauvinistic approach to policy issues and will not make unilateral changes to the 
system, instead, it will seek acceptable regional solutions to such matters" Fourie 
(1993) argued that though a country's natural strong regional position becomes part 
of its foreign policy consciousness and assumes a leadership role which will determine 
its new conception regarding its international role. But in his visit to Mozambique in 
July 1990, Mandela articulated a cautious pol icy expression, saying ..... we do not 
want the political and economic superiority that South Africa has in relation to the 
countries of the region to become used as another form of destabilization (Vale, 
1991 :706)". 
Such a position was also reiterated by Mbeki (1994b) stating that the ANC is opposed 
to the notions and concepts of South Africa as a regional power and leader. In its own 
self-interest, it is inferred that the organization aims at a system of good relations 
governed by agreements arrived at, by regional countries meeting together as equals. 
Against this backdrop, the ANC has accordingly shown reluctance to acknowledge 
South Africa's regional strength and leadership. It could be argued that a democratic 
South Africa should explicitly renounce all hegemonic ambitions in the region , resist all 
pressure to become the ' regional power' at the expense of the rest of the sub-
continent. Thus, such policy expressions and statements merely illustrates the ANC's 
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lack of regional leadership ambitions in the formulation and conduct of a 'new' foreign 
policy contours, despite South Africa's intrinsically strong regional positions,· Instead, 
it could be suggested that a new form of economic interaction in Southern Africa 
based on the principles of mutual benefit and interdependence should be pursued. 
It could be noted that multilateral matters have become progressively more important 
in a world where superpowers rivalry has largely disappeared. For this reason, 
international organization and multilateral forums now playa prominent rol~ than before 
in global politics and relations. Consequently, the ANC foresees that due to an 
increase in economic interdependency, fragility of the planet eco-system, rapid increase 
in technology, there is an underlying necessity to approach international questions and 
issue crisis from a common perspective (ANC, 1994). Thus, the ANC believes a 
judicious multilateral diplomacy and relations will enhance South Africa's international 
status. Such a trend seems to be firm. Hence, the organization has a priority list of 
international organizations, forums and summit in which a 'new' South Africa will 
actively be involved and request membership. 
The ANC believes that a 'new' democratic South Africa as a full, active and enthusiastic 
member of the family of nations in concert will participate fully in the work and debates 
of the United Nations Organisation (ANC, 1994). According to Mandela (1993), 
South Africa is anxious to ensure that the United Nations regains its pivotal and 
democratic role in furthering the interest of those at the margins of the global 
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economy. And, to achieve this, the ANC supports in extending the initiatives of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to help the UN to restore its 
integrity (ANC, 1994). 
The political past meant that South Africans were unable to take advantage of the 
opportunities for membership of international forums that reflects South Africa's rich 
heritage links with many parts of the world. The ANC acknowledge to fortify this heritage 
links to the benefit of all South African citizens as Commonwealth member, 
participator in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, as the~.E:lJorums are 
central institutions of the South in which agendas for the coming decades are going to 
be set (ANC, 1994). 
Chief Emeka Anyaoku (1993) asserts that as a Commonwealth member, South Africa 
will be the Commonwealth's most effective argument against the forces of racial 
discrimination, 'ethnic-cleansing' and all manner of intolerance. Thus, it could be 
proclaimed that a South Africa cleansed of apartheid can bring a true healing touch to 
the activities of the Commonwealth and other world organisation. As pointed out earlier, 
the ANC does not equate non-alignment with isolationism and impotence (Fourie, 
1992), but believe South Africa will campaign actively for the rights for the states of the 
South and the South-North debates that are becoming prominent agendas within the 
Non-Aligned Movement (ANC, 1994). 
Mpho Machesa 78 
As a country of the South, the ANC views the advent of a democratic South Africa in 
developing and sustaining multilateral forums which address the interests of tlJe South 
(ANC, 1994). Thus, a democratic South Africa will play an active and leading role in the 
development and strengthening of multilateral fora which empower the nations of the 
South. In seeking assurance from members of the major trading blocs on the issue of 
market access, Mandela (1993) proposed that a democratic South Africa should strive 
to strengthen the South-South ties and South-North relations in order to protect the 
South against economic marginalization. 
. . . ,... .;. ~~. 
In most instances, as Morgenthau (1973) pronounced security and defence issues fall 
within the realm of foreign policy orientation. Hence, approaches to security and 
defence are developed in the context of wider policies on regional and international 
relations. It could be noted that the security of the state is not only limited to military 
matters but has important political, social , economic and environmental dimensions. 
Against this background, enduring security can be achieved through national, regional 
and international efforts to promote democracy, respect for human rights, sustainable 
development, social justice and environmental protection. 
Thus, the ANC proposed that regional security in Southern Africa be pursued through 
adherence to international law, peaceful settlement of disputes, common security 
arrangements and region-wide disarmament (ANC, 1994). Furthermore, the 
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organization intend to make a democratic South Africa to endorse the international 
resolutions elaborated on Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter - Manila 
Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, Declaration on 
the Principles of International Law conceming friendly relations and co-operations 
among states, and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the 
domestic affairs of states. 
The ANC also believes to commit a 'new' South Africa in becoming a signatory to the 
Geneva Convention and Protocols, join the Geneva-based COrUerence on 
Disarmament, respect the Kampala Declaration of 1991 on arms control in Africa, will 
honour South Africa's undertaking under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and endorse the recognition by the OAU of the positive relationship that exists between 
security, development and disarmament (ANC, 1994). 
The ANC proclaims that the rise of a non-racial, non-sexist democratic South Africa 
from the ashes of apartheid will not terminate its quest for human rights (ANC, 1994). 
It further asserts that it recognises the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and abides by it. Accedes to the Convention on Civil and Political Rights of 
1966, the Optional Protocol which allows the Commission on Human Rights to 
receive individual application for violations of Human Rights, acceded to the signatory 
of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights - the Banjul Charter. 
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Although environmental politics are a new stem on the international agenda. The ANC 
in its foreign policy orientation believes that the 'new' South Africa as a responsible 
international citizen will not avoid grappling with the future of the environment (ANC, 
1994). It promulgate to accept both the spirit and the recommendations of the 1987 
Bruntland Report issued by the United Nations as World Commission on 
Environment and Development and consequently abide by the outcome of the Rio 
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED). 
As part of an effective environmental management system, the ANC believes that 
South Africa will sign the OAU backed Bamako Convention on the Movement of 
Hazardous Waste and as such it will not allow South Africa to become a dumping 
ground for toxic waste (ANC, 1994). Regarding its policy on global environment, the 
ANC asserts that South Africa will embrace a holistic approach to the issue in ensuring 
environmental protection in the public interest. 
5.3. Defining Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy. 
As noted in the text, South Africa paid a heavy political and economical price for its 
apartheid policies. And , such a rejected domestic system, according to Geldenhuys 
(1991), gave it a 'pariah image second to none' within the community of nations. Hence, 
before 1994, its international interaction and relations were distinguished by 
Mpho Machesa 81 
fragmented efforts to achieve divergent goals (Mills, 1996) which led to its exclusion 
and ostracism from the many functions of the international system and redtJced the 
scope of its bilateral relations with other states. 
But the post-1994 period, characterised by a process of democratisation which 
conforms to the international Zeitgeist, advanced South Africa's re-entry to the global 
fora. In line with ANC spell out foreign policy priorities mentioned in the text, South 
Africa was re-admitted as a member-state of the United Nations Organi?,~!ion, as the 
53rd member of the Organization of African Unity, as the Commonwealth's 51 st 
member-country, a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, Group of 77 and SADC 
(Marx, 1995; Lynon, 1994). Became a signatory to a host of bilateral and multilateral 
conventions, forums and summits on different aspects ranging from social, political, 
economical, environmental and military issues (Marx, 1995; Pahad, 1995; Nzo, 1994a; 
1994b; Lynon, 1994). Thus, the country's return to the community of nations made a 
significant contribution to the definition of the general direction to its foreign policy 
conduct. 
Whilst in transition, it could be mentioned that the political structure of the world 
underwent a process of change. As Mills (1996) observed, the 'bipolar world' of the Cold 
War era made way for a 'multipolar world'. But, it could be noted that this 'New World 
Order', about which much has been written and said, has several dimensions. 
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While it relates to the international relation between sovereign countries or regions, its 
emergence reached into the domestic life of individual states (Johnston and Shezi, 
1993). And, South Africa is no exception to that. Hence, as a small to medium-sized 
economic power, South Africa have to playa role in the constructive advancement of 
the 'new' world order towards a more equitable set of practices. 
However, it have became hazardous to read more into the world's reaction than was 
intended: support and admiration for its peaceful democratisation transition. It 
could be noted that the world's reaction did not represent an indefinite continuation of 
the unique relationship which South Africa has experienced since 1994. Hence, a 
discussion of post- apartheid foreign policy and its practical aspects of international 
relations must be seen to take place against the background of the real world. 
Against this background, the dominant issue among foreign policy scholars alike is ..... 
what and how would South Africa post-apartheid foreign policy look like?" (Vale, 
1991; Geldenhuys, 1991; Evans, 1991; Mbeki, 1994; Mills, 1996). Again , it is worth 
asking to what extent is the South African foreign policy establishment capable of taking 
its cue from theories of "complex interdependence rather than political realism" 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977) as guiding paradigms in confronting the new operational 
environment that have opened before them? 
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Since 1994, a restructuring of its foreign policy conduct transpired and much was 
expected. Indeed, such expectations were raised both in Africa and within the 
international community about South Africa's new role and capabilities. But as post-
apartheid South Africa develops its foreign policy principles, objectives and priorities , 
it is impractical to discuss all the trends in detail, but an awareness of the phenomenon 
and of areas in which this occurs must be fostered in this discussion. 
The need for a codified foreign policy and an assessment of current policy approaches 
has been the subject of deliberation for some time in post-apartheid South Africa. As 
we have observed in the preceding discussions that foreign policy is a multidimensional 
set of policies, objectives, principles, strategies and plans which cannot be easily be 
packaged into neatly described "formula". But, it is not always practical to distinguish 
between aspirations, general objectives and underlying philosophy. Nevertheless, it is 
important to consider here in this section the general orientation of post apartheid South 
Africa's policies. 
In his speech to the OAU Heads of Mission Conference, Pretoria in September 
, 
1995, Minister Alfred Nzo (DFA Draft White Paper on Foreign Policy, 1996) spelt 
out South Africa's foreign policy principles in the following terms by pronouncing that 
the underlying principles which serves as guidelines in the conduct of South Africa's 
foreign policy includes, a commitment to the promotion of human rights; to the 
promotion of democracy; to justice and international law in the conduct of relations 
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between nations; to intemational peace and resolutions to conflicts; to the interests of 
Africa in world affairs and a commitment to economic development through-regional 
and intemational cooperation in an interdependent world_ Consequently, Mandela 
(1995) further pronounced that foreign policy as an integrated part of the country policy 
should aimed at safeguarding security and promoting the welfare of South Africa's 
citizens. Such choices between available options in the intemational arena based on 
the country interest and means should be exercised as optimal preferences. 
Thus, Mills (1996) critiqued that South Africa's foreign policy and diplomacy postures 
be based on a consensus of its national interest in an increasingly multipolar system. 
Against this view, it could be argued that such undertakings must be in line with 
intemational practice, including the need for appropriate confidentiality. Hence, by its 
very nature, according to Kaufmann (1988) diplomacy is "quite diplomacy" and not 
diplomacy through media exposures. 
In analysing South Africa policy principles, Pahad (1996) highlighted that, the 
govemment supports the global free trade system by striving to promotes North-South 
and South-South relations to attain equitable socio-economic developments within 
the country and the region. Furthermore, post-apartheid foreign policy architect 
proposed that the United Nations activities should be revitalized and strengthened to 
enable it to deal with matters that will bring sustainable changes and development to 
such global challenges as economical and environmental issues (DFA Draft White 
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Paper on Foreign Policy, 1996). They also believe that confidence - building and 
cooperation should be prominent trends of South Africa's African policy. Hence, efforts 
to alleviate the plight of refugees in Africa and elsewhere, particularly the activities of 
the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) be supported and 
encouraged as far as the country means allow. 
In the preceding discussion mentioned was made about the demise of the bipolar world 
system. For South Africa, and indeed Africa as a whole, such an end brought both 
benefits and new responsibilities. Thus, the most notable trend of this "new" era is a 
move towards political and economic liberalisation (Mills, 1996) in which a body of 
ideas around free - trade and democratic governance are gradually emerging. Within 
this context, it could be argued that the South African government has to take into 
account the needs of its citizens in a continually evolving global order with 
cautiousness. 
In their critique, post-apartheid policy makers do acknowledges the growing economic 
disparities between developed and developing nations. Hence, in his address to the 
Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee of Parliament in March 1995, Minister Nzo 
made the following observation that" ... in terms of foreign policy, Africa is clearly 
to be a priority in the years ahead and the promotion of economic development 
of the Southern Africa region is of paramount importance as the economies of the 
• 
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countries of the continent are intertwined" (DFA Draft White Paper on Foreign 
Policy, 1996). In this view, it could be pointed out that economic relations are, clearly, 
a priority in South Africa's interaction with the international community in bilateral and 
multilateral relations. However, it should be noted that the global economic environment 
in which South Africa finds itself is a fiercely competitive and complex arena (Natrass, 
1992). But it could be suggested that pursuing an integrated "economic and trade 
foreign policy" is pursued, then such global competitions can be contained. 
In his studies, Ins Claude (1971) proclaimed that political and security priorities are 
inextricably linked. Thus, through the prism of such a dictum, Deputy President Mbeki 
in his speech to the United Nations Security Council in May 1994 made the following 
observation ..... we are also committed to participate to full extent of our abilities 
in the efforts spearheaded by the OAU to address the related issues of peace, 
security and stability in our continent" (DFA Draft White Paper on Foreign Policy, 
1996). To affirm such a position, President Mandela at the United Nations General 
Assembly in October 1994, proclaimed that ..... we will play our role to build a 
continent and a region that will help to create for themselves and all humanity a 
common world of peace and security" (DFA, 1996). It could be noted that the two 
above statements summarise the awareness on the part of the government that the 
security and political priorities of South Africa are in Africa. 
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Earlier in this chapter, reference to the challenges of multilateralism was made 
mentioned. Within the area of multilateral relations, discemible socio-economic themes 
have become predominant (Johnston and Shezi,1993). Linked to this, are issues such 
as the problem of refugees, children, gender, human rights and migration. And, within 
the African context, conflict prevention and peace-making process is viewed as a 
substantial concem (Pahad, 1996) by the government because once conflicts occurs, 
diplomacy is faced with a new challenge which is more difficult - traumatic and 
costly - both materially and in terms of human life. 
. ...... , .:. ~ .. 
Thus, Vale (1990) asserts that regional group to which a country belongs often plays 
a fundamental role in multilateral diplomacy. It could be stated that global issues have 
domestic relevance (Obusango, 1990) and, if South Africa seeks to playa role in the 
development of international thinking in this areas it must related not only to 
international objectives but also to domestic policies. On this view, according to 
Geldenhuys (1991), any state foreign policy is aimed at safeguarding a particular 
domestic value system. 
For this chapter to ensure that biasness is not a factor when discussing the nature of 
South Africa's bilateral priorities, it is important to approach the discussion within the 
framework of the United Nations and other international resolution and initiatives. 
It could be noted that post-apartheid foreign policy makers has adopted the view that 
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South Africa's relations with other countries should be a matter of bilateral concern 
between the particular country and South Africa. Hence, two related aspect are 
forwarded to support such a qualification : (a) By trading or concluding diplomatic 
relations, South Africa is not expressing approval to the domestic policies of that 
country's present government. They argue that the most basic reasons for establishing 
diplomatic relations is to create a channel of communication, which, in fact, is then used 
to convey to the government of that country the values which South Africa promotes 
and propagates. (b) The second aspect relates to the perceived implications of 
relations South Africa may have with other states. But in concrete terms they argued 
that South Africa is and should be free to maintain diplomatic and trade relations with 
any state which is not subject to a United Nations economic or trade embargo (DFA, 
1996) and such relations should not pose a real threat to the interests of other states. 
Against this backdrop, a number of characteristics and crucial elements of post-
apartheid South Africa's foreign policy principles and objectives can then be 
summarised and deduced as follows. It could be suggested that post-apartheid South 
Africa should cO[lsistently endeavour to pursue a coherent policy posture which should 
includes economic, security and political components. Preventive diplomacy and pro-
active initiatives should be the approach, rather than reaction to events. 
South Africa should assume a leadership role in Africa and , in all those areas where a 
constructive contribution could be made without pol itically antagonising the country's 
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Africa partners. A diplomacy of bridge-building, sustainable development and 
cooperation between the" North" and the" South" should be pursued. 
In multilateral forums, South Africa should strive to promote its interest towards major 
global issues, such as respect for human rights, democracy, global peace, security and 
the protection of the environment. It should constantly endeavour to positively influence 
and change the direction of events and developments internationally, to the extent that 
they affect South Africa. Diplomatic relations and all related aspects should be a means 
to an end, namely to promote the well - being of the country and its citizens. 
But it may be questioned whether these principles are sufficient, whether they go far 
enough, whether they are achievable, or how far the South African government should 
and can go in imposing them on others? However, in answering such qualifications, it 
could be noted that in most public statements and media releases a number of 
additional cornerstones and main preoccupations of policy postures are propagated as 
they are viewed as a break with the past approaches of the apartheid era. 
5.5. Achievement reached and Dilemmas to overcome. 
As noted in the preceding discussions, it was observed that, through concerted 
endeavours to manifest its foreign policy and international relation status, efforts were 
made to attract large-scale foreign investment, not only to South Africa, but with 
Mpho Machesa 90 
particular emphasis on Southem Africa. Within this context, South Africa desires for 
greater economic co-operation among countries bordering on, and within, the Indian 
Ocean, attended the first meeting of the Indian Ocean Rim countries in March 1995 
held in Mauritius and took an active part in the deliberation (Marx, 1995). 
Following the OAU summit meeting in Tunis in 1994, President Mandela invited Heads 
of States of Angola, Mozambique and Zaire to a meeting in Pretoria in July 1994 to 
facilitate contact between Angola and Zaire on the issue of alleged Za'irian support for 
UNITA (Pahad,1996), and this meeting has positive practical results in the form of a 
subsequent follow-up meeting of a joint Security Commission revived between the two 
countries (Marx, 1995). 
Similarly, South Africa acting in conjunction with Botswana and Zimbabwe, undertook 
mediation at a high level in solving the political crisis in Lesotho (Sowetan, 1995). 
These crises prompted for the establishment of an Association of Southern African 
States (ASAS), to be used as a mechanism to address security concems, resolve and 
prevent conflict within SADC regional context (Marx, 1995). Again, South Africa made 
a substantial contribution to conflict prevention, especially in Africa. And, its 
involvement took place within the framework of the Untied Nations, OAU, SADC and 
other multilateral decisions and action, in particular OAU's Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution (Pahad, 1996; DFA,1996). Further afield , 
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South Africa has taken part in OAU efforts at bringing conflicts to an end in countries 
such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia (Sowetan, 1995). It also participated in 
several diplomatic missions to Burundi and Rwanda, and was part of a special four-
member ministerial mission elected by the OAU to help in resolving the genocide 
conflict in the Great Lake region (McGreal, 1996). In addition, the OAU's East African 
member states requested SADC, of which South Africa is a member, to assist with 
keeping the peace in East Africa. And, in return South Africa has been asked to provide 
'logistical support' to the OAU's team in Burundi (Hartley, 1996). 
And , in bilateral context, it had endeavoured to encourage the return to democracy and 
respect to human rights in sub-Saharan region , especially in Nigeria. At the request 
of President Mandela, Archbishop Desmond Tutu visited Nigeria in April 1995 to 
pursue Nigerian authorities to release both Chief Abiola - presumed winner of the 
aborted Nigerian presidential election of 1993 - and General Obusango - Nigerian 
military ruler to cede power voluntarily to civilian rule - (Marx, 1995). Although , 
neither of these initiatives produced definite results, but underlined South Africa's 
commitment to the advancement of human rights, upholdment and preservement of 
democratic principles and system. Consequently, budgetary constraints limits South 
Africa's capacity to provide African countries with humanitarian aid, but it has, 
according to Pahad (1996), set up vocational training programmes in Mozambique and 
agricultural projects in Lesotho, as well as providing humanitarian assistance to 
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Rwanda and donated substantially to various facilities in Angola. 
Though there has been a considerable achievement in the pursuit of its international 
relations and conduct, post-apartheid South Africa have been currently caught in a 
political Catch 22 situation. 
Political analysts assumed that post-apartheid South Africa would terminate diplomatic 
ties with the Republic of China [Taiwan] in exchange for relations with_t~.e People's 
Republic of China [Communist China] (Breytenbach, 1994), whether it will 
recognize the existence of Po lisa rio led Sahrawi Republic (Rossouw, 1995), 
whether South Africa has became a proxy battlefield for the United States foreign 
policy interests on Cuba (Brummer, 1995) and Iran (Bulbring, 1995). And, also its 
mishandling of the Nigerian crisis (Manga, 1995; Van Niekerk, 1995; Brummer, 1996; 
Davis, 1996). But, according to Mills (1994), it is not a matter of 'if but of 'when' and 
'how' post-apartheid South Africa will deal with such diplomatic dilemmas. 
As stated, a crucial debate that faces post-apartheid foreign policy relations is the 
choice between diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China and the 
Republic of China. On this matter, Breytenbach (1994) argued that South Africa is faced 
with a 'win - lose situation than with a win - win one' as the stake now stand. In 
his reasoning, Blow (1994) proclaimed that what made this situation to be more difficult 
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and problematic is the imposement on South Africa by the two "Chinas" themselves. 
On this issue, policy analysts are eagerly awaiting South Africa's decision t~at would 
provide a clear indication of what is driving its foreign policy approaches" ... interest or 
human rights issues" (Mills, 1996). 
It could be noted that the dilemma facing South Africa is whether to retain ties with 
Taiwan, with which it has developed a close and particularly economically 
advantageous relation since 1990 (Breytenbach, 1994), should it abandon or 
downgrade this ally, which in the last decade has undergone a dramatic and far 
reaching democratisation process (Blow, 1996) or instead favour a government with 
a wretched human right record (Van Breda, 1996), but is a permanent member of the 
United Nations Security Council, and home to one fifth of all humanity and therefore a 
market of immense proportions (Blow, 1996), made more so by the fact that its 
economy also happen to be the world's fastest growing. But, on the balance, policy 
analysts believe that there is a third way out, that of dual recognition (Breytenbach, 
1994; Blow, 1996), which South Africa should follow even though it is suggested as 
been dismissed as a political non - starter by the People's Republic of China. On this 
view, it could be argued that, if such an approach is rejected by the PRC government, 
the offer be left on the table and the current status - quo be pursued. 
It could be noted with despair that, South Africa is fast becoming a proxy battlefield for 
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United States foreign policy on Cuba (Brummer, 1995) and Iran (Bulbring, 1995). 
Diplomatic relations were formally established with Cuba a day after Mandela's 
inauguration and it sent its first ambassador to South Africa in late 1994. But, the 
prospect of South Africa actually opening a diplomatic mission in Cuba, became too 
much for the United States anti - Castro lobby (Brummer, 1995), to an extent that a 
formal protest was issued to the South African government by the chairman of the 
United States House of Representatives, Africa Subcommittee on Foreign Policy. 
On the whole, Tsedu (1995) reiterated that the South African government, particularly 
most ANC parliamentarians who are deeply indebted to Cuba's selfless contribution to 
the anti - apartheid struggle, reject the notion that Cuba must be starved into 
ideological submission by the United States. Thus, as way of keeping with the non -
ideological posture the government has set itself, Manga (1995) proposed that a 
process of democratisation through dialogue and non - confrontational diplomacy be 
fostered with Cuba. A similar protest by the United States government regarding South 
Africa's relations with Iran was lodged (Bulbring, 1995) and certainly, it could be 
, 
inferred that South Africa might approach such a dilemma in the same way as the 
Cuban problem. 
Consequently, Rossouw (1995) proclaimed that the post-apartheid government also 
finds itself in a similar controversy of backpedalling on a commitment for diplomatic 
recognition to Africa's last colony, the Sahrawi Republic, where the Polisario Front 
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has been leading its struggle for freedom from Moroccan occupation of its territory. It 
could be noted that South Africa is the only country in Southern Africa and One of the 
few OAU members that still has ties with Morocco but does not recognise the existence 
of the Sahrawi Republic as an independent state (Davis, 1995). 
According to Davis (1995), one of the reasons why the is a delay on the part of South 
Africa is that it has been officially decide that diplomatic recognition ahead of the United 
Nations supervised referendum in the area is a non - starter. But, independent 
observers, including Human Rights Watch, reported extensively on Moroccan human 
rights abuses and manipulation of the referendum process which has been repeatedly 
delayed and now appears to be in danger of not taking place at all (Rossouw, 1995; 
Davis, 1995). Against this backdrop, the Sahrawi Republic representative in South 
Africa complained that the South African government made a commitment and it is 
unacceptable for the government to use the referendum and United Nations gestures 
as an excuse to delay recognition (Davis, 1995). However, the South African 
government, according to Rossouw (1995), promised to support the UN referendum so 
that the matter of Western Sahara (Sahrawi Republic) be resolved expeditiously and 
peaceful. And, Simon (1996) further stated that President Mandela has requested the 
Foreign ministry to take steps in establishing diplomatic ties with the Sahrawi Republic. 
But, so far only normal procedures for establishing diplomatic relations have been 
instituted by the Foreign ministry. 
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On the issue of cosying up to repressive governments of Nigeria, Sudan and Kenya , it 
has been suggested that in order to install respect for human rights and upholdment of 
democracy, South Africa have to promote democratisation through dialogue (Weekly 
Mail, 1995). Consequently, it could be noted that South Africa's belated determination 
to get tough on the Nigerian regime (Van Niekerk, 1995) recent acts of human rights 
abuses, including the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other nine dissidents 
(Brummer, 1996) exposed the fact that if the country hopes to preserve its place as the 
champion of human rights and democracy in Africa and the world , it r:1eeds-to bring its 
foreign policy into line with its moral standing in the international community 
(Manga,1995). 
To sum up, in dealing with these diplomatic dilemmas the ANC led government should 
not allow its foreign policy relations to be dictated by developed powers of the North nor 
any sovereign state. It has been shown in the text that one of the preambles of the 
Freedom Charter is that a democratic South Africa would establish diplomatic relations 
with all countries of the world regardless of their social and political systems. And such 
relations should be based on mutual 'respect for independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Hence, its diplomacy should be pursued in keeping with the non-
ideological and non-confrontational postures it has set itself. 
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5.6. Conclusion. 
This chapter set out to explore the preliminary contours of the ANC post-apartheid 
policy options and priorities. And it also define a possible direction the 'new' South 
Africa might follow in the "new world order" by engaging in areas of interest and 
problem issues. 
But, despite hopes that the end of superpower confrontation has brought a 'new world 
order', other developments are making the world a more complex place to live in. The 
bipolar world, with its shortcomings, clearly defined the major issues while the 
multipolar world of the 1990's is faced with more complex interdependency issues. 
Thus, matters of economic development, population growth, ethnic friction, trade 
disputes, hazardous industrial development, drug trafficking, AIDS and technological 
development, calls for international co-operation of a kind not experienced before in the 
past. 
For this reason, the foreign policy of a post-apartheid South Africa as envisaged by the 
African National Congress should address a number of matters in all the levels of the 
regional , continental and global systems. It is these circumstances, perhaps even more 
than the transformation of friends into at best, distant and impotent observers, and 
enemies into potential partners and benefactors, that condition the preliminary contours 
of an envisaged new foreign policy orientation of a democratic South Africa. 
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It could then be concluded that the objective would be to help create the situation at all 
systems in which the new South Africa would exist and develop as a democratic, non-
racial, non-aligned and prosperous country. Hence, the realities of ANC international 
policies previously led to continuity in foreign policy processes and its unique policy 
perspectives led to an envisaged change in ideological and pragmatic content, and 
specifics of future South African foreign policy conduct and orientation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
6.1. Introduction. 
This study set out to examine the transition of the foreign policy orientation and conduct 
of the African National Congress between the period 1989 and 1994. It has 
demonstrated that in its years of exile, the character of the ANC foreign policy reflected 
adherence to the politics of liberation and international socialism, challenging the 
'West' on question like the 'new' world economic order and the morals of apartheid 
itself. 
In the foregoing chapters it was shown how the ANC foreign policy was confronted by 
a veritable blizzard of global, regional and domestic political change that challenged its 
basic assumptions on foreign policy approach. And being faced with a problem of 
matching its ideological heritage, its domestic priorities and natural sympathies to a set 
of political and economic circumstances. 
On such basis, this chapter will attempt to present a summary of arguments advanced 
in study in order to have a coherent and convincing conclusion . 
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6.2. Summary of arguments 
As noted in the study, a handful of arguments have been advanced in relation to the 
transition of the foreign policy orientation and conduct of the ANC. 
Chapter One demonstrated the salient aspects of the debates as to the factors 
believed to have transformed the organization's external policy. It observed that some 
foreign policy scholars tend to view the policy transition as a direct result .0Lthe demise 
of bipolar politics and global socialism. 
It propose that domestic perspectives have also inflicted the foreign policy conceptions 
of the ANC. Hence, it is has been reiterated in these chapter that since foreign policy 
analysis is a complex paradigm 'linked' not to a one-dimensional but to multifaceted 
approach effected by both the external and internal political dimensions. Thus, it was 
argued in this chapter that it is not correct to relegate domestic determinants to the 
background as their impact is felt at all strata of the international and regional political 
system. 
In Chapter Two it was shown how the development of the ANC as an exile 
revolutionary movement and the conduct of its foreign pol icy activities not only survive 
exile, but were strengthened by the experience that was to direct it into the post-
apartheid era. 
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In Chapter Three it was observed that domestic and international politics of a polity is 
'linked' in a complex way. And, that the primacy of internal systematic determinants 
such as a change in static politics, evolving structure of the organization leadership, 
tireless campaign to maintain economic sanctions and efforts to re-address the socio-
economic imbalance, re-affirmed the working for the domestic factors in foreign policy 
change and conduct of any political system. 
Thus, the chapter concluded that due to both the global and regional political events 
..... ',.:. .. . 
coupled with the rapid changing domestic sources, the organization shed the bulk of 
the shibboleths of the past rhetoric such as international socialism foreign policy 
approach, and took up a series of a conciliatory pragmatic foreign policy outlook and 
position. 
Chapter Four set out to explore the preliminary contours of the ANC post-apartheid 
policy options. And it was observed that the ANC premise a post-apartheid foreign 
policy based on several active policy priorities. 
The chapter demonstrated that the ANC maintain that a democratic South Africa shall 
be a fully independent state which will respect the rights and sovereignty of nations. 
And will establish diplomatic relations with countries of the international community 
regardless of their social and political systems in order to obtain mutual respect for each 
other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
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In summation, the chapter concluded that a post-apartheid foreign policy conducted 
has become 'pragmatic' and 'interest-driven', and its international priorities are to 
be dictated by the need to ensure economic co-operation and co-existence. 
6.3. Conclusion. 
It could be concluded that it is evident from the discussion outlined that the ANC has 
moved considerably from the flourishes of liberation of the past. By discarding the 
internationalist orientation which was once seen as central to the liberation movement's 
foreign policy, the ANC has demonstrated flexibility and pragmatism in the face of 
changing circumstances. 
The organization , instead, has elaborated a future foreign policy for a democratic South 
Africa which puts domestic concerns ahead of internationalist obligations. And on the 
world centre stage, the ANC foreign policy has found a niche within the post-Cold War 
order as articulated by the United States, the international financial institutions and the 
newly invigorated United Nations. The fiscal regime advocated by international financial 
institutions, the bane of ANC in. power, has been accepted by the organization as 
witnessed by the evolution of its opinion on issue such as investments codes and 
economic co-operation. And, thus the realities of ANC foreign policy led to continuity in 
its external policy orientation and its unique policy perspective changed the ideological 
pragmatic content, and specifics of a democratic post-apartheid South African foreign 
policy conduct. 
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